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Chapter 1
Introduction
The three chapters which form the main body of this thesis are linked
methodologically as well as thematically. The predominant theme is the
financial crisis that started in 2007 in the U.S. housing market. The reper-
cussions of this crisis, which eventually evolved into a global economic crisis,
are felt even today. Naturally, an event of this dimension raises a myriad of
questions. For instance, how is it possible that the crisis, which was thought
to be confined to a relatively small sector of the U.S. financial market, spilled
over into the real economy and negatively affected economic growth around
the world? These and similar questions are related to the causes and un-
derlying mechanisms of the crisis. In order to prevent future crises of this
magnitude, however, one also has to analyse potential policy and regulatory
responses respectively. The thesis at hand is intended to contribute to both
of these research directions.
Beyond that, chapter two and three respectively highlight a promising
alternative to the equilibrium approach for the estimation of market demand
and supply, namely disequilibrium econometric models. What distinguishes
these models from the equilibrium framework is that they do not assume
that market demand and supply are necessarily equal. Instead, the minimum
of demand and supply determines the quantity transacted. Unfortunately,
relaxing the equilibrium assumption generally has a number of unfavourable
implications for the estimation of disequilibrium models. Most notably, the
ease of application of most of these models is lower which is probably why the
great majority of studies apply the equilibrium model. Two important issues
in this respect are disequilibrium model specification and dynamic model
features, which are the topic of the second chapter.
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With regard to the former, researchers not only have to evaluate whether
they should apply the equilibrium or the disequilibrium framework but also
which of the various disequilibrium models fits their data best. The main
distinction in this respect concerns the specification of the price adjustment
process. While some models are based on the assumption that the market
price is fully rigid, others assume that the price adjusts to imbalances be-
tween demand and supply, although it does not have to offset them. Most
studies in the applied literature, however, do not pay attention to the issue
of specification. Against this background, the first part of our analysis in
chapter two deals with disequilibrium model misspecification. In particular,
we evaluate the degree of misspecification of the different canonical disequi-
librium models by means of Monte Carlo sampling experiments. The second
part of the chapter then focuses on dynamic disequilibrium models. The
main question in this respect is how important is the provision for dynamic
model features since static disequilibrium estimators have been found to be
consistent even if the data generating process is dynamic. The results from
chapter two are not only intended to deepen our understanding of the canon-
ical models but also to guide our analysis in chapter three in which we apply
the disequilibrium framework to real world data.
The third chapter deals with the popular conjecture that during the re-
cent financial crisis banks in the U.S. resorted to non-price credit rationing
– a phenomenon which is not to be confounded with conventional price ra-
tioning. According to various accounts banks increased quantity rationing
due to the turmoil in financial markets. This so-called credit crunch allegedly
led to a contraction in economic activity, i.e. it is assumed to be a major
transmission channel of the crisis from the financial to the real sector. Our
analysis employs the disequilibrium econometric framework in order to esti-
mate excess credit demand and the extent of non-price rationing respectively.
With this estimate we then test the credit crunch hypothesis. The main inno-
vation in this respect is the application of an excess demand indicator other
than the change in the loan rate which facilitates estimation immensely. For
instance, using this alternative indicator not only allows us to estimate a wide
array of different disequilibrium models but also to take into account model
dynamics. Chapter three also wants to raise the awareness that disequi-
librium models are an important alternative to the equilibrium framework
which, given the existence of an appropriate excess demand indicator, are
not necessarily associated with a lower ease of application. Furthermore, our
analysis has an important policy dimension. This is because the appropriate
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policy measures in case of non-price credit rationing are different from the
case of conventional price rationing.
Finally, the fourth chapter is concerned with bank wholesale funding and
commercial bank lending. Although the econometric methodology we use in
this chapter is completely different from the two previous chapters, there is
a close thematic relation between the third and the fourth chapter. While
chapter three analyses lending behaviour on an aggregate level, chapter four
looks at the micro level, i.e. the lending behaviour of individual banks. In
other words, the analyses in these two chapters complement each other. The
main focus of attention in the fourth chapter is wholesale funds dependence
and subsequent bank lending. Empirical evidence indicates that banks have
used more and more wholesale funds to finance the asset side of their balance
sheets. The turmoil in wholesale funding markets during the financial crisis
implied that banks with a higher dependence on this type of funds found it
increasingly difficult to secure funding liquidity in these markets. In order to
meet their short-term obligations, banks therefore had to deleverage, mean-
ing that they had to shrink the asset side of their balance sheets. This, in
turn, implied that banks had to sell securities and/or stop lending. Given
this stylised description we test two related hypotheses. First, whether banks
with a higher wholesale dependence decreased subsequent lending more and
second whether the effect of wholesale dependence on subsequent lending is
a decreasing function of the liquidity of a bank’s balance sheet. While some
positive evidence with regard to the first hypothesis has been found, the sec-
ond hypothesis has never been tested before. The results from our analysis
are particularly interesting with regard to banking regulation since empirical
evidence in favour of our two hypotheses would support the introduction of
liquidity standards as proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision in response to the recent crisis.
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Chapter 2
Single-Market Disequilibrium
Models: Insights from Monte
Carlo Simulations
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the estimation of single-market disequilibrium models
in which the price does not fully adjust to clear the market and the shorter
side of the market determines the quantity transacted.1 In particular, our
analysis, which is based on Monte Carlo sampling experiments, is concerned
with the consequences of disequilibrium model misspecification and dynamic
models.
With regard to the former we evaluate whether the degree of misspecifica-
tion increases with the size of a particular model parameter. For instance, it
has been shown that there exists a close relation between disequilibrium spec-
ifications in which the price is not fully rigid, i.e. the price adjusts somewhat
to imbalances between demand and supply, and the equilibrium specification
respectively. This relation is based on the speed of price adjustment, denoted
with γ. Most notably, one can show that for γ →∞ in the limit the proba-
bility density functions (p.d.f.) of the endogenous variables in these different
1For an introduction to multi-market disequilibrium models see, for instance, Quandt
(1988) or Rudebusch (1987). Also note that many authors argue that the term “disequilib-
rium” is a misnomer since it suggest that one faces a situation out of equilibrium. Excess
demand and excess supply respectively could, however, represent equilibrium situations,
albeit not in a Walrasian sense.
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specifications are equivalent. This implies, however, that in terms of endoge-
nous price models the degree of misspecification is a decreasing function of
the parameter γ. While the case of a very high speed of price adjustment
has been analysed thoroughly, the case of γ → 0, corresponding to less and
less price adjustment, has been neglected. This is a shortcoming because a
number of empirical studies provide evidence that the speed of adjustment
can be very low. We address this case and its implications in the first part
of this chapter.
In the second part we discuss dynamic models. The main issue in this
respect is that for disequilibrium models with unknown sample separation,
i.e. models in which it is not possible to infer whether the quantity observed
has been determined by the supply or the demand equation, one cannot derive
the maximum likelihood estimator if the underlying model exhibits dynamic
features such as autocorrelated errors and/or lagged dependent variables.
This is because the likelihood function becomes intractable in these cases.
While a number of authors have suggested to use simulation-based estimation
methods instead, it has been shown that under certain conditions the static
estimators are consistent even in a dynamic setting. Against this background,
we analyse the properties of the static estimators if the true models are
dynamic.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we
provide a short review of the disequilibrium literature where we concentrate
on the canonical model specifications, the maximum likelihood estimation
method and problems associated with the latter. Section 2.3 addresses the
issue of disequilibrium model misspecification, while dynamic models are
covered in section 2.4. Both sections start with a motivation and then give
a detailed description of the Monte Carlo experiments conducted and their
results. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Disequilibrium Models: A Short Review
The seminal article by Fair & Jaffee (1972) on the estimation of disequilib-
rium models was followed by a broad discussion about different model spec-
ifications, estimation methods and other, related issues. We do not review
the whole disequilibrium literature here and instead concentrate on those
specifications and estimation methods that are used in subsequent sections.
For an in-depth treatment of the topic the reader is referred to the excel-
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lent books by Quandt (1988), from which we adopt the taxonomy for the
following description, and Srivastava & Rao (1990).
2.2.1 Canonical Model Specifications
The most basic disequilibrium econometric model, which is referred to as
model A, consists of the following system of equations:
dt = α1pt +α
′
xd,t + d,t (2.1)
st = β1pt + β
′
xs,t + s,t (2.2)
qt = min(dt, st) (2.3)
where dt denotes (unobserved) demand in period t, st is (unobserved)
supply, qt is the actual (observed) quantity transacted in the market, pt is
the market price associated with the parameters α1 and β1 respectively, xd,t
and xs,t are vectors of exogenous variables, α and β are parameter vectors
and d,t and s,t are disturbance terms. The latter are assumed to be jointly
normally distributed as well as serially and mutually independent.
The most distinguishing feature of model A – and all other disequilibrium
models presented below – is that the equilibrium condition qt = dt = st is
replaced by equation (2.3) which implies that the actual quantity transacted
in the market is the minimum of demand and supply.2 Thus, it is assumed
that the price does not clear the market and therefore the latter is charac-
terised by excess demand/supply. In model A the price is even assumed to
be exogenous, i.e. the price is fully rigid meaning that it does not adjust to
imbalances between demand and supply. The minimum condition is usually
justified on the grounds that most markets are characterised by voluntary
exchange, that is neither side of the market is forced to trade more than it
wishes.
Adding a deterministic price adjustment equation such as (2.4) to model
A yields another disequilibrium model which is referred to as model C.3
2The minimum condition serves the same purpose as the equilibrium condition: it
relates the unobserved endogenous variables dt and st to the observed endogenous variable
qt. Due to the unobserved endogenous variables, disequilibrium models also belong to the
class of latent variable models.
3In the literature, model C is also referred to as the quantitative model, since the
change in price is proportional to the quantity of excess demand.
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pt = pt−1 + γ(dt − st) (2.4)
Unlike in A, the price in period t is now endogenous and a function
of the quantity of excess demand – notice that different lag structures are
conceivable with regard to the adjustment equation.4 In contrast to model A
the price adjusts to market imbalances, though it does not necessarily offset
them completely. Furthermore, economic theory suggests that the parameter
γ, associated with the speed of price adjustment, is positive since in case of
excess demand the price is likely to increase while in case of excess supply it
presumably decreases – a generalisation would allow for different adjustment
speeds γ1 and γ2 in case of excess demand and excess supply respectively.
Also note that the two polar cases γ = 0 and γ =∞ correspond to no price
adjustment and perfect price adjustment – the latter means that the price
adjusts to the equilibrium price immediately. If the adjustment equation is
stochastic as in equation (2.5) one finally gets model D.
pt = pt−1 + γ(dt − st) + p,t (2.5)
Notice that the stochastic price adjustment equation could be extended
to include additional explanatory variables. As in model C, the price is
endogenous and the disturbance terms are assumed to be joint normal as
well as serially and mutually independent, i.e. ′t = (d,t s,t p,t) ∼ N (0,Ω)
with the diagonal variance-covariance matrix Ω = diag(σ2d, σ2s , σ2p).
2.2.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation Approach
In the disequilibrium literature, various methods have been suggested for
the estimation of the three canonical models presented above. An important
observation in this respect is that the scope of available methods critically
depends on the model specification and the information contained in it. In-
formation here means knowledge about the sample separation: the minimum
condition separates the observations for qt into observations which are deter-
mined by the demand equation and observations which are determined by
4Maddala (1983) provides a discussion regarding different lag structures. He also offers
the following interpretation of equation (2.4): the price does not rise in response to excess
demand but the market is characterised by excess demand since the price does not fully
adjust.
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the supply equation.5 While from the deterministic price adjustment equa-
tion in model C one can infer the sample separation – note that the sign of
∆pt = pt − pt−1 is observed and thus the sign of (dt − st) and the minimum
are known – there is no such knowledge either in model A or D. This lack of
information, in turn, constrains the methods potentially available for estima-
tion. Model C, for instance, can be estimated with the ordinary two-stage
least squares method, while model A and D cannot – except in cases where
additional information is provided about the sample separation.6
In subsequent sections we concentrate on the maximum likelihood (ML)
method of estimation which is available for all three models. Although the
likelihood functions have already been derived elsewhere, it is a worthwhile
exercise to go through the derivation because it warrants a deeper insight
into the models.
Sample Separation Known
With regard to model C the likelihood function is derived in the following
way. First note that in case of dt < st the price adjustment equation (2.4)
can be written as qt = st + ∆pt/γ, while if dt ≥ st it can be written as
qt = dt −∆pt/γ. Thus, when dt < st model C is given by
qt = α1pt +α
′
xd,t + d,t
qt = β1pt + β
′
xs,t + ∆pt/γ + s,t (2.6)
while for dt ≥ st it is
qt = α1pt +α
′
xd,t −∆pt/γ + d,t
qt = β1pt + β
′
xs,t + s,t (2.7)
Now define the two variables ∆p+t and ∆p
−
t as follows:
5Because of these two regimes disequilibrium models are also referred to as switching
regression models.
6See, for instance, Rudebusch (1987). Also note that the price in model C is a special
case of an excess demand indicator.
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∆p+t =
{
∆pt if ∆pt > 0
0 otherwise
∆p−t =
{
−∆pt if ∆pt < 0
0 otherwise
The two systems (2.6) and (2.7) can then be combined to yield7
qt = α1pt +α
′
xd,t −∆p+t /γ + d,t (2.8)
qt = β1pt + β
′
xs,t −∆p−t /γ + s,t (2.9)
Finally, since the joint density of d,t and s,t is known, one can infer the
log-likelihood function for model C which is given by
logLc = T log(|β1 − α1 + 1/γ|)− T log(2piσdσs)−
T∑
t=1
[
−1
2
(
2d,t
σ2d
− 
2
s,t
σ2s
)]
Sample Separation Unknown
As one can see from above, the derivation of the log-likelihood function for
model C is based on the knowledge about sample separation. In model A
and D respectively, in which sample separation is unknown, the procedure
is necessarily different. Consider model D, for instance – the derivation of
the log-likelihood function for model A is analogous, except that the price
is exogenous. In model D the joint density of dt, st and pt, which can be
derived from the joint density of d,t, s,t and p,t, is given by
g(dt, st, pt) =
|J |
(2pi)3/2 |Ω|1/2
exp
[
−(1/2)′tΩ−1t
]
where |J | is the absolute value of the Jacobian determinant from the trans-
formation of the disturbances to dt, st and pt, Ω is the variance-covariance
matrix of the disturbance terms and
7Notice that equation (2.8) and (2.9) could also be estimated with two-stage least
squares.
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t =
 d,ts,t
p,t
 =
 dt − α1pt −α′xd,tst − β1pt − β′xs,t
pt − pt−1 − γ(dt − st)

Given this density, the next step in the derivation of the log-likelihood
function is to state the model in terms of the observable endogenous variables
qt and pt. First note that the probability that any observation qt belongs to
the demand curve is equal to λt = Prob(dt < st). The probability that
any observation qt belongs to the supply curve is then (1 − λt). Thus, the
conditional joint density of qt and pt for the case that qt = dt and st > qt is
given by
h(qt, pt|qt = dt) =
∫∞
qt
g(qt, st, pt)dst
λt
– note that the denominator λt, i.e. the probability that qt belongs to the
demand curve, is equal to the numerator integrated over qt. Similarly, the
conditional joint density of qt and pt for the case that qt = st and dt ≥ qt is
given by
h(qt, pt|qt = st) =
∫∞
qt
g(dt, qt, pt)ddt
1− λt
Finally, the unconditional joint density of qt and pt can be stated as
h(qt, pt) = λth(qt, pt|qt = dt) + (1− λt)h(qt, pt|qt = st)
=
∫ ∞
qt
g(qt, st, pt)dst +
∫ ∞
qt
g(dt, qt, pt)ddt
Due to the assumption that the disturbances are serially independent,
the log-likelihood function is then given by
logLD =
T∑
t=1
log (h(qt, pt))
2.2.3 Computational Issues with ML
A drawback of the maximum likelihood approach is that even in cases where
the first and second order conditions for the maximisation of the likelihood
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function can be derived analytically, one usually has to employ numerical op-
timization algorithms – like the Marquardt or the BHHH procedure – since
these conditions are complicated non-linear functions. Nevertheless, if the
likelihood function is well-behaved and bounded from above the iterative op-
timisation algorithms have a good chance of converging to a maximum and
the choice of the starting values should not be of vital importance. Unfortu-
nately, though, it is a well-known fact that the likelihood functions in model
A and D respectively are ill-behaved. Besides the possibility of multiple
maxima, one can show that for certain parameter values the functions are
unbounded which makes maximisation extremely difficult.8 The unbounded-
ness problem is a result of the substantial latency in the two models: not only
are the quantities demanded and supplied unobserved but sample separation
is also unknown – notice that unboundedness is not a problem in model C.
According to Quandt (1988), another and probably even more severe issue
with respect to the estimation of disequilibrium models is the problem of
false or spurious maxima. This problem occurs if the iterative optimisation
algorithm drives the estimates into a direction where the likelihood function
is not defined anymore – the latter happens, for instance, if the covariances
between the disturbance terms are non-zero and the variance-covariance ma-
trix becomes singular. In such cases computation usually breaks down at
estimates which are far from the true parameter values.
The computational problems outlined above are a major concern. Our
main focus of attention in the following two sections, however, is directed to-
wards the issue of disequilibrium model misspecification and dynamic models.
2.3 Disequilibrium Model Misspecification
In estimating market demand and supply the researcher faces the problem
of choosing the most appropriate model specification for the data at hand.
To facilitate her choice, a number of tests have been developed. One set of
tests is concerned with whether to choose the standard equilibrium model
or a disequilibrium model. Hwang (1980) introduced a simple test to dis-
tinguish between the equilibrium and the disequilibrium hypothesis (model
8More on this point is provided in Maddala (1983), for instance. Quandt (1988) notes
in this respect that in order to circumvent the unboundedness problem one should avoid
the maximum likelihood method and use non-linear least squares instead. Laroque &
Salanie (1994), however, find that the performance of the latter is very poor.
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A). Quandt (1988), in turn, presents test procedures with which one can
distinguish between the equilibrium model and model C and D respectively.
A second group of misspecification tests, in contrast, focuses on the differ-
ent disequilibrium specifications. A Lagrange multiplier test by Hajivassiliou
(1986), for example, tests for price endogeneity and supports the researcher
in determining whether model A or a model in which the price is endogenous,
as in model C or D, is more appropriate. Goldfeld & Quandt (1981), on the
other hand, present a simple procedure to test whether model C or model D
should be selected.
In addition, they analyse the consequences of estimating a misspecified
endogenous price model, e.g. estimating model C although the data have
been generated by model D or the equilibrium model. In doing so, they
emphasise the asymptotic relation between model C and D respectively on
the one hand and the equilibrium model on the other, namely that for γ →∞
the p.d.f. in model C and D converge to the p.d.f. in the equilibrium model,
implying that in the limit the estimators of these models are the same. In
other words the equilibrium model is nested both in model C and D. Given
this result, Goldfeld & Quandt then show by means of sampling experiments
that as γ increases the degree of misspecification of model C, D and the
equilibrium model respectively decreases.
Our analysis, in contrast, concentrates on cases where the speed of price
adjustment is very low, i.e. in which γ → 0, and the polar case of γ = 0
respectively. Given the dominance of the equilibrium model it is not as-
tonishing that most studies are concerned with the opposite case. However,
various applied studies, such as Laffont & Garcia (1977), Sealey (1979) or
Kugler (1987), find that in many markets the speed of price adjustment is
sluggish at best. Furthermore, the case of very slow price adjustment is
closely related to disequilibrium model A, in which the price is fully rigid,
and therefore our analysis sheds light on the degree of misspecification among
the different canonical disequilibrium models. For instance, we argue below
that under the true model C or D the degree of misspecification of model A
– reflected in the quality of the estimates it provides – should decrease for
lower true values of γ. And finally, since model A has recently enjoyed great
popularity in the applied disequilibrium literature, our results have strong
implications for the validity of these studies.9
9Examples in this respect are Pazarbasioglu (1997), Gosh & Gosh (1999), Kim (1999),
Barajas & Steiner (2002), Nehls & Schmidt (2003), Ikhide (2003) and Allain & Oulidi
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Based on a preliminary examination of the different model specifications
we expect to find the following results. First, it is straightforward to see
that if γ → 0 either in model C or D then in the limit the price becomes
exogenous in both models. In particular, for γ = 0 the non-stochastic price
adjustment equation (2.4) implies that the price is constant while in case
of the stochastic price adjustment equation (2.5) the price follows a random
walk. This implies that two special variants of model A are nested in model
C and D respectively.10 For this reason we anticipate that the degree of
misspecification of model A is an increasing function of γ both under the
true model C and D.11 Finally, if the true model is A and the speed of price
adjustment is implicitly equal to zero, we believe that the performance of
both estimator C and D are highly sensitive to the starting value provided
for γ: for high values estimator C and D should perform worse than for
low values – in the following we use the term performance to describe the
quality or accuracy of the estimates provided by the various disequilibrium
estimators.
In order to test these hypotheses and to highlight the consequences of
disequilibrium model misspecification, particularly with regard to model A,
we have conducted a number of Monte Carlo sampling experiments which
are presented in the following section.
2.3.1 Design of Misspecification Experiments
Table 2.1 in the appendix provides an overview of the Monte Carlo misspec-
ification experiments we have conducted. As one can see from the table,
there are four groups of experiments. In the first group we analyse the per-
formance of the equilibrium estimator and estimator A in case the data have
been generated by the equilibrium model and model A respectively. We do
not expect estimator A to perform well under the true equilibrium model
and vice versa. Next, in experiment 2.1 to 2.3 the true model is A and
we test the performance of estimator C. These experiments differ from each
(2009).
10Note that while in the polar case of γ = 0 estimator A is closely related to the
estimators of model C and D, this relation is somewhat looser than between the equilibrium
estimator and estimators C and D in the polar case of γ =∞.
11In a seminal contribution Maddala & Nelson (1974) have stumbled across this result
before. They show by means of a small-scale Monte Carlo simulation that estimator A
performs well even though the data have been generated by a model very similar to C.
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other in the choice of the starting value for γ. The other experiments in this
group, i.e. experiment 2.4 to 2.6, are designed in a similar fashion, with the
only difference that they test the performance of estimator D. Finally, in the
third and fourth group of experiments we test the performance of estimator
A under the true model C and D respectively. As indicated above, we expect
estimator A to perform better the lower the true value of γ. Also note that
in contrast to the first two groups of experiments we estimate model A, C
and D in group three and four. This is because of the close relation between
specification C and D: for σ2p → 0 the p.d.f. in model D converges to the
p.d.f. in model C.
The number of replications S and the number of observations T is the
same for all experiments. The choice of S = 500 reflects our interest to
achieve both a high accuracy in terms of our results and a relatively short
computing time while T = 100 is typically encountered in applied work, e.g.
with quarterly data. The models which we used to generate our artificial
data can be summarised as follows:
dt = α1 + α2x1,t + α3pt + d,t
st = β1 + β2x2,t + β3pt + s,t
qt =
{
dt = st for the Equilibrium Model
min(dt, st) for Model A/C/D
pt =
{
pt−1 + γ(dt − st) for Model C
pt−1 + γ(dt − st) + p,t for Model D
where α1 = 2, α2 = 1, α3 = −0.5, β1 = 1.4, β2 = 0.8 and β3 = 0.1.
The disturbance terms d,t, s,t and p,t, which are randomly drawn in each
replication, have a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2d =
1.44, σ2s = 1 and σ2p. The two exogenous variables x1 and x2, which are fixed
in every replication, have been generated from a uniform distribution over
the range (10,15) and (11,17) respectively. In addition, for the experiments
in group three and four we need an observation on the initial price level for
which we choose p0 = 3.5. For experiments where the true model is A, we
assume that the exogenous price series is drawn from a uniform distribution
over the range (2,5) and is fixed for all replications. The true parameter
values for γ and σ2p are given in Table 2.1.
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The reason for this particular selection of true parameter values and dis-
tributional assumptions is that they guarantee a good mix of the two regimes,
i.e. with respect to model A, C and D approximately half of the observations
on qt are determined by the demand equation while the other half is deter-
mined by the supply equation. All models are estimated with the maximum
likelihood method, for which we used the Marquardt iterative optimisation
algorithm. The starting values required for this algorithm are drawn from
uniform distributions with the lower and the upper bounds equal to 90% and
110% respectively of the true parameter values.
In order to evaluate the performance of the different estimators we employ
the mean absolute deviation (MAD) from the true values. We also accounted
for computational problems that occurred during the experiments and which
are presumably associated with unbounded likelihood functions and false
maxima. Since the estimates in these cases are not reliable we discarded
them in order not to distort our results.
2.3.2 Results of Misspecification Experiments
The results of our misspecification analysis can be summarised as follows.
In the first group of experiments we find that neither the equilibrium esti-
mator nor estimator A perform well if the data have been generated by the
respective other model – although in one instance the equilibrium estimator
outperforms estimator A (see Table 2.2). Nevertheless, it seems to be more
costly to estimate model A with the equilibrium estimator than to estimate
the equilibrium model with estimator A: while the median MAD of estimator
A under the true equilibrium model equals 0.20 – for the equilibrium estima-
tor we get 0.08 – the median MAD of the equilibrium estimator under the
true model A equals 1.17 while for estimator A we get 0.14.12 Furthermore,
the equilibrium estimator encounters a lot more computational problems if
the data have been generated by model A than estimator A encounters with
equilibrium data.
Our results for the second group of experiments show that the perfor-
mance of estimator C under the true model A is in fact highly sensitive to
the starting value provided for γ, meaning that the degree of misspecification
decreases for lower values (see Table 2.3). Estimator C even outperforms es-
12Qualitatively, Goldfeld & Quandt (1981) observe a similar result with regard to esti-
mator C and D and the equilibrium estimator.
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timator A for a very low starting value: in experiment 2.3 estimator C yields
lower mean absolute deviations than estimator A in all instances. The start-
ing value of γ also seems to influence the performance of estimator C with
regard to computational problems, i.e. less problems occur for lower values.
A completely different picture arises in experiment 2.4 to 2.6 in which we
focus on the performance of estimator D under the true model A (see Ta-
ble 2.4). Here the degree of misspecification seems to be independent of the
starting value provided for γ.
Let us now turn to the results of the misspecification experiments in which
model A is the misspecified model and the data have been generated either by
model C or D. From a practical point of view, these results are probably most
relevant because a large number of studies in the disequilibrium literature
rely on model A. In case the true model is C we observe that the degree
of misspecification of A in fact increases with γ although only slightly (see
Table 2.5). In terms of lower mean absolute deviations, estimator A never
outperforms estimator C. However, for a high starting value of σ2p, which is
implicitly equal to zero in model C, estimator A outperforms estimator D.
Interestingly, estimator A did encounter hardly any computational problems
if the true model is C while estimator D was presumably plagued by the
unboundedness problem. Besides, the quality of the estimates provided by
estimator C and D decrease as γ decreases. If the data have been generated
by model D then the degree of misspecification of model A seems to increase
more than under the true model C. In some experiments with a very low γ
estimator A even outperforms estimator D (see Table 2.6). Furthermore, for
a high true value of σ2p, estimator A outperforms estimator C, which yields
very poor estimates in this case. As in all other experiments, estimator A did
encounter hardly any computational problems – except for experiment 4.4
in which all estimators were plagued by computational problems. Similar to
our observation in the third group, we find that estimators C and D perform
poorly for low values of γ.
In summary, we can maintain the following. In case the true model is
either model C or D, the degree of misspecification of model A is an increasing
function of γ. Nevertheless the estimates provided by estimator A reach a
reasonable level of accuracy only for very low true values of γ. Besides, these
results are more pronounced in case the data have been generated by model
D. If A is the true model and we estimate model C and D respectively,
we observe that the performance of estimator C is highly sensitive to the
starting value provided for γ, meaning that for very low values estimator
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C performs quite well, while estimator D is not. Furthermore, we have the
impression that it is more costly to estimate either model C or D under the
true model A than to estimate model A under the true model C and D.
A similar result seems to be valid for model A and the equilibrium model.
Finally, we find that the estimation of model A is associated with surprisingly
few computational problems irrespective of the true model.
2.4 Dynamic Models
Another topic that has attracted a lot of attention in the disequilibrium lit-
erature is the estimation of disequilibrium models with dynamic features.
The reason is that disequilibrium models are usually applied to time series
data. This implies that basic assumptions used for the derivation of the like-
lihood functions of the canonical models, such as no autocorrelation in the
error terms and no lagged endogenous explanatory variables, are likely to
be violated. However, the estimation of models with unknown sample sep-
aration becomes extremely difficult or even impossible if these assumptions
are relaxed. For instance, although one can derive the appropriate likelihood
function for model A under the assumption of autocorrelated errors, the func-
tion is very complex since it involves T -fold integrals with 2T summations.
For model C, in contrast, where sample separation is known, one can derive
a likelihood function that is both tractable and accounts for autocorrelation
in the disturbances as well as lagged endogenous variables.
Many studies in the disequilibrium literature have therefore concentrated
on estimators that account for dynamic features and that are based on
tractable likelihood functions. Most of them use various simulation-based
estimation methods. Laroque & Salanie (1993), for instance, propose a simu-
lated pseudo maximum likelihood (SPML) method. This approach represents
a limited information method which is not based on the entire distribution
of the endogenous variables but only on its first two conditional moments.
The approach is simulation-based because the two moments are simulated by
their empirical counterparts. Lee (1997), in turn, uses a simulated maximum
likelihood (SML) approach, in which intractable expectation terms in the
likelihood function are replaced with counterparts from Monte Carlo simula-
tions – note that the derived estimator is valid for model A only. According
to Fermanian & Salanie (2004), the SPML approach can be applied to many
models but it does not yield efficient estimators, while the SML method yields
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efficient estimators but can only be applied to a restrictive class of models.
Although preliminary results from Monte Carlo experiments show that these
estimators yield relatively good estimates, a definitive assessment of these
alternative methods is still missing. For instance, both methods described
above have merely been tested with data generated by model A, i.e. it is
unknown how the SPML method, for instance, performs in a setting where
the price is endogenous. Furthermore and due to the fact that some of these
simulation-based estimation methods are rather difficult to implement, they
are not yet established in the applied disequilibrium literature and so there
are no reports regarding experiences with these methods.
Our analysis, on the other hand, is based on a result by Gourieroux et al.
(1985) who show for a general class of models, including disequilibrium mod-
els with unknown sample separation, that the maximum likelihood estimator
derived from a static model remains consistent even if the disturbances are
serially correlated. As noted by Quandt (1988), however, this result will
not hold generally in case of lagged endogenous variables while Laroque &
Salanie (1993) indicate that consistency should hold for the case of a linear
model with normal disturbances. Given these results regarding the asymp-
totic properties of the static estimators, we analyse by means of sampling
experiments the properties of the static estimators A and D in case the data
generating process exhibits dynamic features.
2.4.1 Design of Dynamic Model Experiments
In our dynamic model experiments the true models A and D respectively
either involve autocorrelated errors or lagged endogenous variables or both
– except for experiment 5 and 6 which serve as benchmark. An overview of
these experiments is given in Table 2.7 in the appendix. Our artificial data
are generated by the following models:
26
dt = α1 + α2x1,t + α3pt + α4dt−1 + d,t
st = β1 + β2x2,t + β3pt + β4st−1 + s,t
qt = min(dt, st)
pt = pt−1 + γ(dt − st) + p,t (for Model D)
d,t = ρ1d,t−1 + ud,t
s,t = ρ2s,t−1 + us,t
p,t = ρ3p,t−1 + up,t (for Model D)
where α1 = 2, α2 = 1, α3 = −0.5, β1 = 1.4, β2 = 0.8, β3 = 0.1 and
γ = 0.5. The true parameter values for α4 and β4 as well as the autocorre-
lation coefficients ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 are given in Table 2.7. From the table one
can see that in experiment 5.1, 5.4, 6.1 and 6.4 the dynamics come from
autocorrelated errors while in experiment 5.2, 5.5, 6.2 and 6.5 the errors are
serially independent but the explanatory variables include lagged endogenous
variables. Finally, in experiment 5.3, 5.6, 6.3 and 6.6 we have both auto-
correlated errors and lagged endogenous explanatory variables. The main
difference between these experiments is how strongly the dynamic features
are pronounced. The disturbance terms ud,t, us,t and up,t, have a normal dis-
tribution with mean zero and variance σ2d = 1.44, σ2s = 1 and σ2p = 0.72. In
our experiments with autocorrelated errors we choose ud,0 = us,0 = up,0 = 0.
The two exogenous variables x1 and x2 are again generated from a uniform
distribution over the range (10,15) and (11,17) respectively. As before, for
the experiments in which the true model is A, we assume that the exogenous
price series is drawn from a uniform distribution over the range (2,5) and
that it is fixed for all replications. For experiments with lagged endogenous
variables, we also need observations on the initial quantity of demand and
supply. We assume that in t = 0 the market is in equilibrium and therefore
d0 = s0 = 15. For the initial price level we choose p0 = 3.5. This particu-
lar selection of true parameter values and distributional assumptions again
guarantees that approximately half of the observations on qt are determined
by the demand equation while the other half is determined by the supply
equation. For the estimation of the parameters we once again used the Mar-
quardt iterative optimisation algorithm. The starting values are drawn from
uniform distributions with the lower and the upper bounds equal to 90% and
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110% respectively of the true values. The properties of the static estimators
are then evaluated by means of the mean absolute deviation (MAD) from
the true values. As in our misspecification experiments, we set the number
of observations to T = 100 and the number of replications to S = 500 in all
experiments. We also account for computational problems as before.
2.4.2 Results of Dynamic Model Experiments
First consider the results regarding model A. Table 2.8 shows that if the
dynamics are not too strong then the static estimator performs well even
if the errors are autocorrelated or there are lagged endogenous explanatory
variables. Most notably, the summary statistics for these two dynamic cases
do not differ substantially from those of the static case. If the true model
exhibits both dynamic features the performance of the static estimator A
gets worse but still seems to be tolerable. For instance, if the true model
is static then the median MAD equals 0.15 while in case of autocorrelated
errors and lagged endogenous explanatory variables we get 0.23 – for the case
of autocorrelated errors and lagged endogenous variables respectively we get
0.17 and 0.16. Furthermore, except for experiment 5.3, we observe that the
static estimator does not encounter more computational problems than in
the static case.
However, we get a different picture if we look at the experiments in which
the dynamics are more pronounced. From Table 2.9 we clearly see that the
performance of the static estimator suffers substantially in comparison to
the benchmark static case. This fact does not only manifest itself in higher
summary statistics but also in an increase in the computational problems
encountered during estimation. These results are particularly true for the
case where the true model involves lagged endogenous variables. In contrast
to the experiments with weak dynamics, the performance of the static es-
timator in case of autocorrelated errors and lagged endogenous explanatory
variables is intolerable, meaning, for instance, that the median MAD equals
0.67 – the corresponding figure for the static case is 0.15. With regard to
the discussion surrounding the presence of lagged endogenous explanatory
variables we observe that the static estimator A performs better if the error
terms are autocorrelated than if the true model involves lagged endogenous
variables.
In terms of the dynamic structure experiments for model D we find very
similar results as for model A. First, in case of weak dynamics the static
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estimator D performs rather well in case of autocorrelated errors or lagged
endogenous explanatory variables (see Table 2.10). In addition, the sum-
mary statistics for the case of autocorrelated errors and lagged endogenous
variables do not differ substantially from the statistics of the static case. As
before, however, the more distinct the dynamics of the underlying model get
the worse is the performance of the static estimator (see Table 2.11), which
becomes apparent not only from an increase in the summary statistics but
also from a higher frequency of computational problems encountered during
estimation.
In summary, the results from our dynamic structure experiments show
that the performances of the static estimators A and D are not convincing
if the data have been generated by a model featuring autocorrelated errors
and/or lagged endogenous variables. The fact that both estimators perform
rather well for less pronounced dynamics is only a small comfort in this
respect.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyse the consequences and the degree respectively of
disequilibrium model misspecification as well as the performance of static
disequilibrium estimators in dynamic settings. The sampling experiments
conducted for this purpose allow us to draw the following conclusions. While
most empirical studies that apply the canonical disequilibrium models have
not paid attention to the issue of misspecification, our results suggest that
this is a shortcoming. In particular, the consequences of disequilibrium model
misspecification are a minor issue only for a very narrow range of the speed of
price adjustment. For instance, if the latter is close to zero and the true model
is either model C or D then estimating model A can yield reasonable results
– primarily if the true model is D. Outside this range, however, misspecifica-
tion leads to highly biased estimates. Furthermore, our results indicate that
researchers should not rely upon the fact that the static estimators for model
A and D remain consistent if the data generating model exhibits dynamic
features such as autocorrelated errors and/or lagged endogenous variables.
If the dynamics are not too pronounced the static estimators actually yield
reasonable estimates. However, if the dynamics become stronger this re-
sult does not hold anymore. Our findings therefore suggest that researchers
should account for model dynamics and different specifications.
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Chapter 3
Non-Price Credit Rationing by
U.S. Commercial Banks During
the Great Recession
3.1 Introduction
The bursting of a bubble in the U.S. housing market in early 2007 triggered
a global financial and economic crisis not witnessed since the Great Depres-
sion.1 While at first only the financial sector was affected, the crisis quickly
spread out into the real economy. Bank lending has been assumed to be an
important transmission channel. According to conventional wisdom, the se-
vere disruptions within the financial system led banks to cut back on lending
sharply. This rationing of credit, in turn, resulted in a contraction in con-
sumption and investment and economic activity as a whole. For this reason,
the term “credit crunch”, which is meant to describe a sharp reduction in
bank credit supply, became one of the many names for the crisis.
Although this view about the transmission of the crisis enjoys widespread
acceptance it is also subject to controversy. Chari et al. (2008), for instance,
provide empirical evidence for the U.S. showing that aggregate lending to
nonfinancial borrowers actually increased during the first phase of the crisis.2
1For a preliminary analysis of the crisis, which is referred to as the Great Recession,
see, for instance, Blanchard (2008), Brunnermeier (2009) or Krishnamurthy (2010).
2The results by Chari et al. (2008), however, are based on data up to October 25,
2008, i.e. they only partially reflect the financial turmoil that followed the collapse of the
investment bank Lehman Brothers.
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The findings of Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010), on the other hand, who analyse
the U.S. market for syndicated loans are consistent with the credit crunch
hypothesis. They admit, however, that the observed contraction in lending
could also be explained with a reduced demand for credit due to cyclical
weakness – according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the
recession in the U.S. already started in the fourth quarter of 2007. Contessi
& Francis (2009), in turn, show that credit flows in the fourth quarter of 2008
resembled the behaviour during the 1990-91 recession which is commonly
associated with a credit crunch.
Against this background this chapter investigates if the U.S. market for
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans exhibits signs of a supply-induced
credit crunch. In particular, we analyse whether U.S. commercial banks
increased non-price credit rationing sharply during the financial crisis that
started in 2007. Our analysis is based on a disequilibrium econometric frame-
work that enables us to quantify the extent of (the change in) credit rationing
in the U.S. market for C&I loans. The main innovation in this respect is the
application of an excess demand indicator other than the change in the loan
rate with which we can relate observations on the credit quantity to a de-
mand and a supply regime respectively. In contrast to previous studies, this
classification not only allows us to estimate a rich array of dynamic dise-
quilibrium models but also to unify two hitherto different approaches in the
empirical credit rationing literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 pro-
vides a short review of the empirical literature on credit rationing with a
particular emphasis on the U.S. credit market. It also deals with the asso-
ciated literature on credit crunches. In section 3.3 we present our empirical
models and we undertake a preliminary analysis of the applied excess de-
mand indicators. The section closes with a presentation of our estimation
results. Finally, section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
In general, one has to distinguish between (conventional) price and non-price
rationing. The former refers to the allocation of scarce goods and services
using prices, i.e. only agents who are willing and able to pay the market price
can purchase a particular good or service while all other agents are rationed.
In the following, however, we are mainly concerned with non-price rationing.
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For simplicity, the latter is referred to as rationing throughout the text.
With regard to credit, rationing is usually defined as a situation in which
the demand for credit exceeds the supply at the ruling market price, i.e. the
demand of some borrowers is unfulfilled although they would be willing to
pay the market price. As noted by Baltensperger (1978), the meaning of the
term price is a subtle issue in this respect. Under the narrow, more traditional
definition of rationing the market price represents a vector that includes the
interest rate as well as other loan terms, such as collateral requirements. The
broader definition, on the contrary, equates the market price with the interest
rate.
Furthermore, one has to distinguish between “equilibrium” and “disequi-
librium” rationing. The latter is a temporary phenomenon that occurs during
the adjustment process from one (Walrasian-) equilibrium to another. It is
associated with situations after an exogenous shock in which the price, i.e.
the loan rate, does not instantaneously adjust to balance credit demand and
supply due to price stickiness. Equilibrium rationing, in contrast, is defined
as a permanent phenomenon that is due to information asymmetries in the
market.3 It describes
“[. . . ] circumstances in which either (a) among loan applicants
who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not,
and the rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if they
offered to pay a higher interest rate; or (b) there are identifiable
groups of individuals in the population who, with a given supply
of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even
though with a larger supply of credit they would.” (Stiglitz &
Weiss 1981)
While the contributions to the theoretical credit rationing literature are
numerous, empirical evidence regarding this phenomenon is relatively scarce.
The main problem is that credit demand and supply – and thus the differ-
ence between the two – are not directly observable.4 For this reason various
indirect approaches – based on proxy measures, survey data or testable im-
plications – have been developed. Although these approaches are capable of
3In our view, though, the boundary between equilibrium and disequilibrium rationing
is blurred. A case which supports our view is where the price adjusts only marginally to
imbalances between demand and supply.
4Available data include the actual credit quantity transacted in the market – or more
precisely the quantity of loans outstanding.
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providing evidence for the existence of credit rationing they cannot quantify
its extent. The only direct approach with which one can estimate excess de-
mand and excess supply respectively are so-called disequilibrium econometric
models.
3.2.1 Indirect Approaches to Credit Rationing
Jaffee & Modigliani (1969) were among the first to apply the proxy method.
They argue that the (unobservable) degree of rationing, defined as the ratio
of rationed credit to potential demand from rationed customers, is closely
related to an (observable) proxy measure given by the ratio of loans granted
to risk-free customers – approximated by loans granted at the prime rate – to
total loans. In particular, they show that the proxy measure is a monotonic
function of the degree of rationing. Using this proxy, they provide evidence
that there exist considerable variations in the degree of rationing over time
in the U.S. market for C&I loans.5
A typical exponent of the survey method, which plays an important role
in our own analysis, is Harris (1974). He argues that credit rationing is
based on the allocation of credit via non-price criteria. As a result, rationing
is closely associated with changes in non-price loan terms, i.e. changes in
credit standards of banks. Positive rationing (or excess demand) occurs when
banks increase non-price requirements on loans while an easing of require-
ments implies negative rationing (or excess supply).6 For his analysis of the
U.S. market for C&I loans Harris uses data from the Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices conducted every quarter by U.S.
monetary authorities. In this survey, loan officers from a representative se-
lection of U.S. commercial banks are asked whether their credit standards
have changed over the past three months and how they would characterise
this change – basically, the categories are tightened, unchanged and eased.
The net percentage of respondents reporting a tightening of standards, i.e.
the difference between the percentage of those reporting a tightening and
those reporting an easing of standards, then serves as an indicator of credit
rationing. While a positive balance indicates that credit standards have been
5One problem with this approach is that the proxy does not only vary with the degree
of rationing but also because of changes in another parameter, which is not necessarily
constant over time.
6Note that according to the classification of Baltensperger (1978) this definition of
rationing falls into the broad category.
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made more stringent across banks implying positive credit rationing, a neg-
ative balance indicates negative rationing. Using survey data from 1964 to
1970, Harris is able to provide evidence for the existence and variability of
credit rationing in the U.S.
Berger & Udell (1992), in turn, use testable implications to find empirical
evidence for rationing. Although their results suggest that the commercial
loan rate in the U.S. is sticky as with disequilibrium rationing, they argue that
this stickiness reflects rationing only partially. Their argument is based on
two main findings: first, half of the loan rate stickiness occurs on loans made
under a commitment. These loans, however, are contractually protected
from rationing. And second, the ratio of loans made under commitment and
loans made under no commitment should rise in times of tight credit, i.e. in
times when credit is rationed. Their results suggest that this is not the case.
Therefore they conclude that although credit rationing may exist it probably
does not constitute an important macroeconomic phenomenon.
3.2.2 Disequilibrium Econometric Models
As already indicated above, unlike the indirect approaches disequilibrium
models can be used to estimate excess demand directly and thus to quantify
the extent of credit rationing. The most basic specification of a disequilibrium
model is given by the following system of equations:
dt = α1pt +α2
′
xd,t + d,t (3.1)
st = β1pt + β2
′
xs,t + s,t (3.2)
qt = min(dt, st) (3.3)
where dt denotes demand in period t, st is supply, qt is the actual quantity
transacted in the market, pt is the market price associated with the parame-
ters α1 and β1 respectively, xd,t and xs,t are vectors of exogenous variables,
α2 and β2 are parameter vectors and d,t and s,t are disturbance terms.
The latter are usually assumed to be jointly normally distributed as well as
serially and mutually independent.
The most distinguishing feature of this model is that instead of an equi-
librium condition of the form qt = dt = st it includes a minimum condition
implying that the actual quantity transacted in the market is the minimum
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of demand and supply. Hence, it is not assumed that the price clears the mar-
ket. The minimum condition (3.3) is usually justified on the grounds that
most markets are characterised by voluntary exchange, i.e. neither side of
the market is forced to trade more than it wishes. Since the price is assumed
to be exogenous in equations (3.1) to (3.3), i.e. the price is fully rigid in
the sense that it does not adjust to imbalances between demand and supply,
the system is often augmented by a price adjustment equation to make the
price explicitly endogenous. The adjustment equation usually takes one of
the following two forms:
pt = pt−1 + γ(dt − st) (3.4a)
pt = pt−1 + γ(dt − st) + p,t (3.4b)
Although price adjustment is deterministic in equation (3.4a) and stochas-
tic in equation (3.4b), the price in period t is in both cases endogenous and
a function of the quantity of excess demand, i.e. it adjusts to market imbal-
ances, though it does not necessarily offset them. The parameter γ captures
the speed of price adjustment and is assumed to be positive. In case of the
stochastic price adjustment equation the disturbance terms of the system
are commonly assumed to be joint normal as well as serially and mutually
independent.
Equations (3.1) to (3.3) are usually referred to as model A while equations
(3.1) to (3.4a) and (3.1) to (3.4b) are referred to as model C and model D
respectively. The three models, representing the canonical disequilibrium
models, differ from each other in some important respects. First, in model A
and D sample separation is unknown while in model C it is known.7 Sample
separation means that the minimum condition separates the observations
for qt into observations which are determined by the demand equation and
observations which are determined by the supply equation. A lack of sample
separation information has a number of important implications for estimation
which we discuss in more detail in section 3.3.1. Furthermore, whether the
price is assumed to be exogenous or endogenous is closely related to the type
of credit rationing that is associated with each model. Model C and D are
based on the assumption of price stickiness, i.e. although in the short-run
the price maybe different from the equilibrium level implying rationing, in
7Note that in model C the sign of ∆pt = pt − pt−1 and thus the sign of (dt − st) and
the minimum are known.
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the long-run it is assumed to return to its equilibrium level. Hence, one can
analyse disequilibrium or temporary rationing with these two models. Model
A, on the other hand, captures the essence of equilibrium rationing since
the price is not assumed to change due to imbalances between supply and
demand.
The disequilibrium method was first introduced in a seminal paper by Fair
& Jaffee (1972). Since then a number of studies have applied disequilibrium
models to credit markets. Sealey (1979), for instance, applied model D to
U.S. commercial & industrial loan market data. Analysing the time period
from 1952 to 1977, he finds that the market for C&I loans is characterised by
disequilibrium rationing and that the magnitude of the imbalance between
credit supply and demand can be quite large. His results, which are consistent
with the findings of Harris (1974), further indicate that the speed of price
adjustment is rather low. Furthermore, they suggest that the U.S. credit
market is characterised by both periods of excess demand and periods of
excess supply.
In another study, Ito & Ueda (1981) use a variant of model C proposed
by Bowden (1978) to analyse the adjustment speed of the loan rate in the
U.S. and the Japanese credit market respectively.8 Their results indicate
that in the U.S. the prime loan rate adjusts rapidly to imbalances between
credit demand and supply and that there is no significant difference between
the upward and the downward adjustment speed, i.e. the interest rate does
not react differently to excess demand and excess supply. The former result
implies that one cannot reject the hypothesis that demand is always equal
to supply in the U.S. credit market.
King (1986), meanwhile, focuses on equilibrium rationing in the U.S.
market for C&I loans. Applying model A, he finds mixed support for the hy-
pothesis of equilibrium credit rationing. In contrast to what the equilibrium
rationing model would predict, his results suggest that the loan rate elastic-
ity of supply is significantly different from zero. However, he interprets the
fact that the C&I loan market seems to be predominantly in a state of excess
demand as evidence for equilibrium rationing.
The study by Kugler (1987), in which the credit markets in Switzerland,
West Germany, the United Kingdom and the U.S. are analysed using the
8In the specification suggested by Bowden (1978), the price in period t is a weighted
average of the price in the previous period and the equilibrium price in period t. According
to some authors, this specification offers a number of advantages in terms of testing the
disequilibrium hypothesis against the equilibrium hypothesis.
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Bowden (1978) specification, again concentrates on the speed of price adjust-
ment. Based on his results, Kugler cannot reject the equilibrium hypothesis
for the U.S., which is consistent with the findings of Ito & Ueda (1981). Fur-
thermore the hypothesis of equal upward and downward adjustment speeds
cannot be rejected in all four countries.
Finally, in his empirical analysis of credit rationing in the U.S. commer-
cial & industrial loan market, Mayer (1989) argues that the notion that the
price tends to change in the direction of excess demand – incorporated in
deterministic price adjustment equations such as (3.4a) – is too vague to be
used in the estimation of credit demand and supply. Although he indicates
that stochastic adjustment equations such as (3.4b) remedy this deficiency,
he claims that models including the latter are computationally much more
difficult to handle and therefore suggests to use a different model. The price
adjustment process he proposes is based on the notion that the probability
of a price increase is higher in case of excess demand than in case of excess
supply. For this approach, it is not necessary to specify explicitly a price
adjustment equation and the likelihood function of the new model is compu-
tationally simpler.9 Using data from 1979 to 1984 he estimates credit demand
and supply showing that there is a reasonable pattern of excess demand. His
results are consistent with those of Sealey (1979).
3.2.3 Credit Rationing and Credit Crunches
In addition to the papers presented in the previous section that concentrate
on credit rationing per se, in recent years a number of studies have used
the disequilibrium econometric framework to analyse so-called credit crunch
episodes. As we point out below, these episodes can involve non-price credit
rationing. Unfortunately, though, the academic literature differs about this
connection. In general,
“The term ‘credit crunch’ has come to be applied indiscriminately
[. . . ] to describe any and all conditions of expensive or difficult-
to-obtain credit. Such usage provides a catchy label, but one with
no particular content. (Wojnilower 1994)
The controversy about the term credit crunch mainly refers to the mani-
festations of this phenomenon. In a seminal paper on the subject Bernanke
9Mayer (1989) admits, however, that some rather restrictive assumptions are necessary
to estimate this new model.
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& Lown (1991) define a crunch as a significant leftward shift in the supply
curve for bank loans that causes a sharp increase in price rationing and which
does not necessarily involve quantity or non-price rationing. Other scholars
like Friedman (1991), however, doubt that a simple leftward shift or a mere
increase in price rationing would qualify as a crunch. A number of authors
have tried to reconcile these two views by defining a credit crunch as a re-
duced willingness to lend which manifests itself either in the form of a sharp
increase in price or non-price rationing.10 We adhere to this latter, more
comprehensive definition of a crunch.
The above described disagreement has produced different empirical ap-
proaches to analyse potential credit crunch episodes. In the following we
focus on studies that relate a crunch to non-price credit rationing.11 Ex-
amples in this respect are Pazarbasioglu (1997), Gosh & Gosh (1999), Kim
(1999), Barajas & Steiner (2002), Ikhide (2003), Nehls & Schmidt (2003),
Allain & Oulidi (2009) and Poghosyan (2010). These studies apply the dis-
equilibrium framework – most often model A – to loan market data from
various countries, excluding the U.S. In large part their results indicate that
the loan markets under investigation are characterised by credit rationing.
With the exception of Nehls & Schmidt (2003), most of these studies regard
non-price credit rationing per se as an indicator for a credit crunch. The
definition of a crunch, however, suggests that non-price rationing is not a
sufficient condition for a credit crunch. Theoretical as well as empirical ev-
idence indicate that non-price rationing constitutes a usual phenomenon in
credit markets which is consistent with normal bank behaviour and that the
degree of rationing is likely to change over time and the business cycle. Thus,
one has to identify time periods in which excess demand for credit was ex-
ceptionally high in order to provide evidence for a crunch. Therefore the aim
of the subsequent empirical analysis is to analyse whether U.S. commercial
banks increased non-price credit rationing sharply during the global financial
crisis that started in 2007.
10See, for instance, Akhtar (1993).
11Bernanke & Lown (1991), Berger & Udell (1994), Peek & Rosengren (1995) and
Brinkmann & Horvitz (1995) are examples of studies that analyse credit crunch episodes
from a different perspective.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Preliminary Discussion
In section 3.2.2 we have pointed out that a lack of sample separation informa-
tion has important implications for the estimation of disequilibrium models.
For instance, the estimation of model A and D respectively, in which sam-
ple separation is unknown, is restricted to a few methods of which maximum
likelihood is the most widely-used.12 For the latter one usually has to provide
sensible starting values, which is a difficult task. In addition, it is well known
that the likelihood functions of models with unknown sample separation are
ill-behaved. Maddala (1983), for instance, shows that for certain parameter
values the functions are unbounded rendering maximisation impossible. Ac-
cording to Quandt (1988), this is the result of the substantial latency in these
models: not only are the quantities demanded and supplied unobserved but
sample separation is also unknown.
Accounting for dynamics in models with unknown sample separation
poses another, even more severe problem. The issue is that after loosen-
ing the basic assumptions of the canonical models, that is no autocorrelated
disturbances and no lagged endogenous variables, estimation becomes ex-
tremely difficult since the resulting likelihood functions are very complex –
an example would be the likelihood function for model A under the assump-
tion of autocorrelated errors. However, estimating dynamic disequilibrium
models is important for several reasons, including the fact that they are usu-
ally applied to time series data which is why the basic assumptions mentioned
above are likely to be violated.
In addition, Browne (1987) notes that most disequilibrium studies that
analyse credit markets implicitly assume that there are no adjustment costs
to the quantity of credit. While this might be true for credit flows, it is hard
to argue that banks as well as borrowers can adjust their stock of outstand-
ing credit instantaneously and without cost. Since data on credit flows are
not (publicly) available and one has to work with stock variables, adjust-
ment costs should be accounted for by including lagged credit quantities as
explanatory variables in both the demand and the supply equation as sug-
gested by Ito & Ueda (1981). According to Browne (1987), the exclusion of
the lagged quantities potentially leads to wrong conclusions about the extent
12More information on alternative estimation methods, like non-linear least squares, is
provided in Quandt (1988) and Srivastava & Rao (1990).
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of rationing. This is because short-run imbalances between credit demand
and supply could erroneously be attributed to dynamic credit rationing al-
though they are a consequence of quantity adjustment costs.
While Gourieroux et al. (1985) have shown that the estimators of static
disequilibrium models with unknown sample separation remain consistent
even if the disturbance terms are autocorrelated, Quandt (1988) notes that
this result not necessarily holds for the case of lagged endogenous variables.
Recent contributions in the disequilibrium literature have thus tried to de-
velop estimation methods which are both tractable and which account for
various kinds of model dynamics. Examples in this respect are Laroque &
Salanie (1993) and Lee (1997) who propose simulation based maximum like-
lihood estimation methods.
We, in turn, adopt a different strategy which is based on the fact that
models with known sample separation do not share the problems outlined
above. Apart from the maximum likelihood method, model C, for instance,
can be estimated with the standard two-stage least squares procedure. Fur-
thermore it is possible to estimate dynamic versions of the model with auto-
correlated errors and/or lagged endogenous variables. However, some authors
like Mayer (1989) argue that the deterministic price adjustment equation in
model C is too strong an assumption and that the change in the price is
probably not a good excess demand indicator.
In terms of the U.S. market for C&I loans and the associated loan rate
this criticism seems to be justified for the following reason. The deterministic
price adjustment equation (3.4a) not only implies that excess demand is
proportional to the change in the price but that excess demand is the major
determinant of the price. Figure 3.1, however, suggests that this is not the
case for the loan rate. Instead the bank prime loan rate (BPLR) closely
follows the U.S. federal funds effective rate (FFER). Hence, changes in the
loan rate are not due to excess credit demand but to changes in the interest
rate target of the U.S. Fed.
In order to account for the criticism surrounding price adjustment equa-
tions, an indicator other than the change in the loan rate is needed. The
survey method by Harris (1974) provides such an indicator.13 Although it
remains difficult to determine whether the regime classification information
provided by this alternative indicator is correct and hence the estimates are
13The indicator proposed by Harris (1974) has already been used successfully in the past
by Lown & Morgan (2006), though in a somewhat different context.
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Figure 3.1: Loan Rate and Federal Funds Rate
sufficiently reliable, Rudebusch (1987) notes that the potential bias resulting
from a non-perfect regime classification should be considered together with
the large increase in model tractability. In fact, in combining the survey
method with the disequilibrium approach it is possible to estimate models
with a priori unknown sample separation with a wide array of methods and
without worrying about unbounded likelihood functions and other difficulties
while at the same time model dynamics can be taken into account. Thus,
in contrast to models without any sample separation information one can
confront many sources of misspecification that would bias the estimation
results.
3.3.2 Models with Sample Separation Information
In our analysis of credit rationing in the U.S. market for C&I loans we proceed
as follows. First we estimate a dynamic version of model C. In a second step
we estimate models with the excess demand indicator proposed by Harris
(1974). In particular equations (3.1) to (3.3) are augmented by the following
indicator equation
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dt − st = δ(zt+1 − z∗) (3.5)
where dt and st are credit demand and supply respectively, the indicator
variable zt+1 is the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit
standards in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey and z∗ is the equilibrium
value of the indicator – the subsequent discussion makes it clear that z∗ = 0.
Since the survey in period t+1 refers to changes in credit standards in period
t, the appropriate time index of the indicator in equation (3.5) is t+ 1. The
parameter δ, which is assumed to be positive, is a factor of proportionality,
i.e. excess demand for credit is proportional to the net percentage of banks
tightening credit standards.
If the net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of standards is pos-
itive, i.e. if zt+1 > 0, then credit demand in period t is bigger than credit
supply, i.e. dt > st, meaning that there is positive credit rationing. The
underlying intuition is the following. If the percentage of banks tightening
credit standards for C&I loans gets bigger than the percentage easing them,
a certain fraction of firms, who would have got a business loan before, are
now quantity rationed although they would be willing to pay the market rate
on C&I loans. In case that zt+1 < 0 the argument is similar in nature.
In terms of estimation, the main advantage of equation (3.5) becomes
evident if it is combined with the minimum condition (3.3). For instance, if
st < dt one can infer that st = qt and dt = qt + δzt+1. Thus, a system of
simultaneous equations with unobserved endogenous variables, i.e. dt and st,
is easily transformed into a system where all variables are observed – lagged
endogenous credit quantities are handled in the same fashion.14 Disequilib-
rium models transformed in this way can be estimated by standard least
squares procedures for simultaneous equation models.15 Also note that in
the augmented model the price is a priori exogenous. Since this is a rather
restrictive assumption we estimate two variants of the model: one in which
the price is exogenous and one in which it is implicitly endogenous. This ap-
proach has the advantage that we do not have to specify a price adjustment
equation explicitly in order for the price to be endogenous.
14Note that in model C the transformation works in a similar way. This can be seen from
equation (3.4a). Given that st < dt, one can infer that st = qt and dt = qt + (1/γ)∆pt.
15For more details on the transformed systems see the appendix.
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3.3.3 Demand & Supply Specification
In order to complete the models outlined in the previous section we have to
specify the demand and the supply equation respectively. In doing so we
adhere to previous studies presented in section 3.2.2.
With regard to the factors determining credit supply we note the fol-
lowing.16 Given the amount of loanable funds, in particular deposits, banks
have to decide how to allocate these funds. The portfolio decision whether
to originate loans or to invest in other assets mainly depends on risk-return
considerations. If the spread between the loan rate and the rate on alterna-
tive assets, such as government securities, widens it becomes, ceteris paribus,
more profitable to invest in loans. The decision to originate loans is further
strengthened by a favourable economic outlook, which makes it less likely
that borrowers cannot repay their loans. Finally, one should account for
quantity adjustment costs and the costs of loanable funds. Thus, bank loan
supply is specified in the following way:
st = g(rL,t − rT,t, TDt, IPt−1, CDt, st−1) (3.6)
where rL is the rate on short-term business loans, rT is the rate on alter-
native assets represented by government treasury bills, TD is the amount of
total deposits, IP is an index of industrial production reflecting expectations
about the economic outlook, CD measures the costs per dollar of deposits
and st−1 accounts for quantity adjustment costs and other, unobserved fac-
tors. The reason, why we use the lagged value of the index of industrial
production is that one should not use a proxy for future economic activity
that potentially reflects credit rationing, like investment in period t. Prior
expectations about these factors determining credit supply indicate that ex-
cept for the effect of the variable CD, which is indeterminate, all factors
should affect supply positively.17
In terms of the demand specification, three decisions made by firms are
considered. They concern the questions whether firms should invest at all,
whether firms should finance their investments with internal or external funds
16In terms of the supply specification, many studies refer to Melitz & Pardue (1973).
17On the one hand we would expect that an increase in the costs per dollar of deposits
reduces banking activity as a whole, implying less credit supply. However, an increase in
the variable CD also indicates that banks are less dependent on demand deposits and that
their operations are mainly funded by time deposits. Hence the liquidity needs by banks
decrease and therefore they can invest their funds in more illiquid assets such as loans.
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– note that firms also need funds to finance their ongoing operations, i.e.
working capital – and finally which type of external financing they should
use. Unfortunately, there is no theoretical framework for the analysis of this
interrelated decision making process of firms on which we could base our
specification – the supply specification, in contrast, is largely based on the
microeconomic theory of the banking firm. Nevertheless, we can maintain
the following. Firms are likely to invest and to produce more respectively if
their expectations about future economic activity are positive. Furthermore,
if firms produce at full capacity, they are likely to invest in new equipment.
Whether firms finance their investments and operations internally or exter-
nally depends on the amount (and cost) of internal funds. And finally, if firms
decide to use external funds, the demand for credit is affected by the cost
of alternative forms of external financing, e.g. bonds or commercial paper.18
Therefore we specify demand as follows:
dt = f(rA,t − rL,t, PTt−1, IPt−1, CUt−1, dt−1) (3.7)
where rL is again the interest rate on short-term business loans, rA is the
interest paid on alternative forms of external financing, PT are corporate
profits after taxes, which are a proxy for internal funds, IP is the index of
industrial production and CU is capacity utilisation. We also include dt−1
to account for quantity adjustment costs and other, unobserved factors. The
variables PT , IP and CU are lagged by one period to allow for a time lag
in the decision making process of firms. A priori we would expect that all
variables, except for profits, affect demand positively.19
3.3.4 Data & Preliminary Analysis
For our estimations we use data from the U.S. Federal Reserve System.20 For
a detailed description of the different variables see Table 3.4 in the appendix.
18Notice that for small and to a certain extent also medium sized firms, bank loans
still represent the sole form of external financing, while for large firms there exist various
alternatives.
19The effect of profits after taxes is ambiguous for the following reason. On the one
hand, if firms have higher profits they are less dependent on bank credit. On the other
hand, banks are more likely to lend to firms if they have higher profits.
20The data we use for our analysis can be obtained via the Data Download Pro-
gramme on the website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm).
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We use quarterly data from 1990:q1 to 2010:q2 – in case that only monthly
data are available we calculate three-month averages. Our choice of this
particular sample period is mainly governed by the fact that there is a break
in the indicator series z since banks have not been asked about the tightening
of credit standards from 1984 to 1990.
Except for the interest rates and the indicator z all data are seasonally
adjusted. The nominal variables q, i.e. the quantity of loans outstanding,
TD and PT are normalised by the GDP deflator with base year 2005.21
Interest rates are measured in percentage points and have been adjusted for
inflation by subtracting the annual increase in the GDP deflator. The reason
for using real data is simply that we do not want our results to be distorted
by changes in the price level.
Also note that the credit quantity q used throughout our analysis is a
stock variable measuring the nominal amount of loans outstanding. We use
this variable because there are no publicly available data on credit flows –
data on individual C&I loans from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending
of the FED, for instance, are not only classified information but they are
also gathered infrequently. For this reason the credit demand and supply
specifications from above should be interpreted as describing the desired
amount of bank debt firms want to hold and banks are willing to offer.
The variable CD, representing the costs per dollar of deposits, is calcu-
lated as follows. First we multiply the value of time and savings deposits
with the 6-month (real) interest rate on certificates of deposits. The latter
is a proxy for the rate paid on time and savings deposits. This gives the
total costs for time and savings deposits. These costs are then divided by
the value of total deposits to get the costs per dollar of deposits. The CD
variable was suggested by Melitz & Pardue (1973). They argue that the costs
for checkable and demand deposits respectively are usually offset by service
fees charged by banks and therefore the costs for deposits only accrue from
time and savings deposits.
It is also worth mentioning that the indicator variable z measures the net
percentage of banks tightening credit standards for large and medium sized
firms. Although there exists another series referring to the tightening of
credit standards for small firms, it is irrelevant which series one uses because
they move closely together and have a correlation coefficient higher than 0.95.
21Nominal and real GDP data are from the website of the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm).
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A much more serious issue is the fact that the time series used for our
analysis are integrated of order one.22 This implies that estimations using
levels could face spurious regression problems. While disequilibrium studies
in the past did not account for this issue, we estimate our models in first
differences.
Also note that our results regarding rationing are mainly driven by the
applied excess demand indicator and the estimate for the factor of propor-
tionality δ. This is because an estimate for excess demand is given by δˆit,
with it being the indicator variable which is either equal to ∆rL,t or zt+1,
while an estimate for the change in excess demand is given by δˆ∆it – see
also the appendix. Due to the importance of the excess demand indicator
we have conducted a preliminary analysis in which we compare ∆rL and z.
This comparison yields the following results.
Figure 3.2 depicts the levels of the two indicators for the full sample
period. The upper half of the graph shows indicator z (right axis) while
indicator ∆rL is depicted in the lower half (left axis) – the measurement unit
for both axis is percentage points. An indicator level below the zero line
implies that credit supply is bigger than credit demand, i.e. excess supply of
credit, while an indicator level above the zero line represents excess demand
for credit.
The first observation from Figure 3.2 is that both series indicate times
of excess credit demand and excess credit supply. However, the indicator
∆rL is much less persistent than z. As a result, the former indicates more
regime changes than the latter. Furthermore, the two indicators provide
very different information regarding the regime, i.e. demand or supply, that
determines the observed credit quantity. For instance, while the change in
the loan rate indicates that the credit quantity observed between 2000 and
2002 was mainly determined by demand, implying excess supply of credit,
the net percentage of banks tightening credit standards indicates an excess
demand for credit – the same is true for the time period of the financial crisis
that started in 2007.
Next consider Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 which depict first differences of
the two indicators. The bars in both graphs represent changes in excess
22Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reveal that for none of our time series we can reject
the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% level of significance except for the indicator
variable z. Further tests indicate that the first differences of the series are stationary. See
also Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 in the appendix for a graphical representation of our data.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Indicators (Levels)
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Figure 3.3: Indicator ∆rL (First Differences)
demand while the areas between the horizontal lines indicate the interval
given by the mean of the first differences plus/minus two standard deviations.
As one can see from the two figures, most changes in excess demand are
within the interval. Thus, both indicators suggest that changes in excess
demand are usually not drastic. Furthermore, there is only one time period
for which both indicators display a sharp increase in credit rationing, i.e.
an increase that exceeds two standard deviations, namely the financial crisis
that started in 2007 – note, however, that the quarters in which these sharp
increases are indicated are not the same.
Although this is a promising result the discrepancies between the two
indicators described above raise the question which of the two provides a
more accurate picture of credit rationing in the U.S. market for C&I loans. In
section 3.3.1 we have argued that changes in the loan rate are more related to
changes in the interest rate target of the FED than to excess credit demand.
More important, though, seems to be the fact that theoretical evidence
suggests that in times of high uncertainty or stress credit is likely to be
rationed more. The dashed vertical lines in Figure 3.2 are three examples for
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Figure 3.4: Indicator z (First Differences)
such time periods – from left to right they indicate the Russian debt crisis
and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management respectively in the third
quarter of 1998, the middle of the bear market in the U.S. that followed the
bursting of the dotcom bubble and which lasted from the first quarter of 2000
to the fourth quarter of 2002 and finally the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
in the third quarter of 2008 at the height of the subprime mortgage crisis.
As the graph demonstrates, indicator z reaches peaks during all three time
periods, i.e. it indicates that credit rationing was relatively high during these
events which is consistent with expectations. The change in the loan rate,
on the other hand, does not indicate excess demand for credit during any of
these events and actually indicates the opposite.23 The likely reason for this
is the aforementioned relation between the loan rate and the federal funds
rate and the fact that the FED tried to calm financial markets by lowering
23The so-called savings and loan crisis, which affected the U.S. economy until the be-
ginning of the 1990ies, is another example in this respect. This time period is generally
associated with a credit crunch. While the change in the loan rate does not indicate credit
rationing, the net percentage of banks tightening credit does (see Figure 3.2).
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the federal funds rate during all these events. Taken together, we interpret
these results as evidence in favour of the excess demand indicator z.
The preceding analysis shows that both excess demand indicators sug-
gest that U.S. commercial banks increased non-price rationing of C&I loans
sharply during the recent financial crisis. Whether this increase was econom-
ically significant or not depends on the estimate for δ which we deal with in
the next section.
3.3.5 Estimation Results
In the following, we refer to the disequilibrium model in which the change
in the loan rate serves as excess demand indicator as model C. Model E, in
turn, in which the loan rate is assumed to be exogenous, is based on the
indicator proposed by Harris (1974). Model F employs the same indicator
but the loan rate is implicitly endogenous.
Besides estimating our models in first differences, we apply three-stage
least squares instead of the conventional system version of two-stage least
squares. This is because exogenous shocks are likely to affect both the
change in credit demand and the change in credit supply, implying that
the disturbance terms in our equations are contemporaneously correlated.
Our estimation results are summarised in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.24 Due to
the presence of lagged endogenous variables in all three models, we have to
be particularly careful with regard to autocorrelated disturbances. Tests for
autocorrelation, however, suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no autocorrelation up to lag twelve at a standard level of significance in
any of our models. Jarque-Bera tests further indicate that the disturbances
in all three models are normally distributed.
In terms of the goodness of fit we observe that the variation in the ex-
plaining variables accounts for a high fraction of the total variation in the
explained variable. In addition, we find that the fit for the equation describ-
ing the change in supply is higher in all three models. This could reflect the
fact that the demand specification is less grounded in theory than the supply
specification.
Examining the parameter estimates we see that the coefficient on the
change in capacity utilisation ∆CUt−1 has the wrong sign and is insignificant
24Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics while the stars indicate the level of significance,
i.e. ∗ implies significance at the 10% level, ∗∗ indicates significance at the 5% level and
∗∗∗ stands for the 1% level of significance.
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Equation:
∆qt = β1 + β2∆(rL,t − rT,t) + β3∆TDt + β4∆IPt−1
+β5∆CDt + β6(∆qt−1 + δ∆i−t−1)− δ∆i−t + us,t
Coeff. Estim. Model C Model E Model F
const. -2.5848 -2.6300 -2.5404
(-1.9277)∗ (-2.2594)∗∗ (-1.6339)
∆(rL,t − rT,t) 26.8972 8.6613 32.5792
(2.6670)∗∗∗ (2.6785)∗∗∗ (2.8439)∗∗∗
∆TDt 0.0378 0.0352 0.0407
(2.2226)∗∗ (2.7297)∗∗∗ (1.9386)∗
∆IPt−1 4.6291 5.2967 4.0523
(3.9912)∗∗∗ (5.5395)∗∗∗ (2.9552)∗∗∗
∆CDt 5.0063 5.4404 6.9982
(1.9493)∗ (2.9111)∗∗∗ (2.4528)∗∗
∆qt−1 0.7705 0.7665 0.7648
(16.7215)∗∗∗ (17.2122)∗∗∗ (14.3948)∗∗∗
∆i−t 2.7121 0.1129 0.2377
(1.4553) (1.4424) (2.2611)∗∗
Obs. 79 80 80
adj. R2 0.8151 0.8162 0.7976
Table 3.1: Estimation Results (Change in Credit Supply)
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Equation:
∆qt = α1 + α2∆(rA,t − rL,t) + α3∆PTt−1 + α4∆IPt−1
+α5∆CUt−1 + α6(∆qt−1 + δ∆i+t−1)− δ∆i+t + ud,t
Coeff. Estim. Model C Model E Model F
const. -2.3578 -1.7630 -2.5963
(-1.4480) (-1.2142) (-1.5622)
∆(rA,t − rL,t) -0.5548 -3.4126 -0.4345
(-0.2198) (-1.7285)∗ (-0.1596)
∆PTt−1 0.0762 0.0420 0.0914
(2.8841)∗∗∗ (2.1035)∗∗ (3.3632)∗∗∗
∆IPt−1 5.4412 5.0613 5.7729
(2.3727)∗∗ (2.6604)∗∗∗ (2.3798)∗∗
∆CUt−1 -1.6360 -0.7685 -1.6816
(-0.6100) (-0.3730) (-0.5932)
∆qt−1 0.8401 0.8164 0.8510
(13.8968)∗∗∗ (14.6840)∗∗∗ (14.7503)∗∗∗
∆i+t 2.7121 0.1129 0.2377
(1.4553) (1.4424) (2.2611)∗∗
Obs. 79 80 80
adj. R2 0.7585 0.7564 0.7690
Table 3.2: Estimation Results (Change in Credit Demand)
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in all three models. The coefficient on the change in the lagged index of in-
dustrial production ∆IPt−1, on the other hand, is significantly different from
zero in both equations and in all three models. Besides, it has the right sign,
i.e. an increase in the index, indicating a more favourable economic outlook,
increases both credit demand and credit supply. Since capacity utilisation is
more related to long term investments these results could indicate that firms
use bank credit mainly to finance their working capital.
Next consider the coefficient on the change in the spread between the rate
on alternative forms of external financing and the loan rate, i.e. ∆(rA,t−rL,t).
Although the coefficient has the right sign in all three models, meaning that
an increase in the spread causes credit demand to increase, it is significantly
different from zero only in model E. We believe that the insignificance is
either due to the fact that the interest rate on AAA-rated corporate bonds is
a bad proxy for the rate on alternative external funds or that credit demand
does not depend on the spread but the loan rate itself. The main intuition for
the latter is that, as we have pointed out above, the only source of external
financing for small and medium sized firms is bank credit. Therefore credit
demand does not depend on the loan rate relative to the rate on other sources
of funds but on the level of the loan rate.25
The coefficient on the change in the spread between the loan rate and the
rate on alternative assets, i.e. ∆(rL,t− rT,t), in turn, is significantly different
from zero and has the right sign in all three models. Hence, if the spread
increases credit supply increases too.
Furthermore we find that the coefficients on ∆TDt and ∆PTt−1, i.e. on
the change in the amount of total deposits and the change in profits after
taxes lagged by one period, are significant in all three models. The coefficient
sign of ∆TDt is positive, indicating that an increase in the amount of loanable
funds implies that credit supply increases. The positive sign of the coefficient
on the change in profits supports the hypothesis that it is easier for profitable
firms to get external financing and that these firms do not substitute external
with internal funds.
25Using the change in the loan rate instead of the change in the spread does not change
the results dramatically. In fact they get worse – the coefficient on ∆TDt, for instance,
becomes insignificant in model C. Unfortunately we could not check whether we have a
bad proxy due to the absence of any alternative time series for the rate on alternative
forms of external financing: while the series on the commercial paper rate is too short,
the series on the rate on BAA-rated corporate bonds is nearly identical with the series for
AAA-rated bonds.
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The coefficient on the change in the costs per dollar of deposits ∆CDt is
found to be significantly different from zero in all three models. The positive
sign of the coefficient indicates that credit supply increases if the costs per
dollar of deposits increase. This counterintuitive result lends support to the
hypothesis that if banks rely more on time and savings deposits they need
less liquid assets and can therefore invest their funds in more illiquid assets
such as loans.
Finally, the change in the lagged quantity of loans outstanding ∆qt−1 is
highly significant in both equations and in all three models. The magnitude of
these estimates suggests that there are high adjustment costs to the quantity
of outstanding credit for both lenders and borrowers, although they seem to
be higher for borrowers.
As already indicated above, however, the coefficient estimate we are most
interested in is δˆ, i.e. the coefficient on the (change in the) indicator variable.
This estimate allows us to calculate an estimate for (the change in) excess
credit demand. In model C the coefficient has the right sign but is not
significantly different from zero. According to Quandt (1988) this result
indicates that the speed of adjustment of the loan rate in the U.S. market
for C&I loans to imbalances between credit supply and demand is very high,
meaning that the equilibrium framework would be more appropriate. This
finding is consistent with the conclusions of Ito & Ueda (1981) and Kugler
(1987). In model E, in which we use the indicator proposed by Harris (1974),
the estimate for δ is also not significantly different from zero. However, if we
relax the assumption of an exogenous loan rate, as in model F, the coefficient
becomes significant.26 Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient appears to be
rather small, i.e. δˆ = 0.2377.
Based on this parameter estimate we have calculated estimates for credit
demand and supply respectively, excess demand, the change in excess demand
and the ratio of excess demand to total demand. Table 3.3 shows our results
for the time period from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of
2009. From the table we conclude the following.
The second largest increase in excess credit demand in the whole sample
period, i.e. from the first quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 2010,
namely 6.18 bn (constant 2005 USD) occurred from the second to the third
26If we include the residuals from the reduced form estimation of the change in the
loan rate as explanatory variable in both structural equations we find that the estimated
coefficients on this residual variable are significantly different from zero – at least in the
supply equation. Therefore we conclude that the loan rate is in fact endogenous.
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Quarter dˆ sˆ dˆ− sˆ ∆(dˆ− sˆ) (dˆ− sˆ)/dˆ
2007:q1 949.74 950.62 -0.88 -0.88 –
2007:q2 975.51 973.72 1.78 2.66 0.18%
2007:q3 1,024.05 1,019.48 4.56 2.78 0.45%
2007:q4 1,081.93 1,074.27 7.65 3.09 0.71%
2008:q1 1,127.19 1,114.02 13.17 5.52 1.17%
2008:q2 1,133.41 1,119.72 13.69 0.52 1.21%
2008:q3 1,141.79 1,121.91 19.87 6.18 1.74%
2008:q4 1,170.31 1,155.05 15.26 -4.61 1.30%
2009:q1 1,124.20 1,114.79 9.41 -5.85 0.84%
2009:q2 1,083.99 1,076.51 7.45 -1.93 0.69%
2009:q3 1,012.06 1,008.73 3.33 -4.16 0.33%
2009:q4 955.29 956.60 -1.31 -4.64 –
Table 3.3: Credit Market Estimates
quarter of 2008. This finding suggests that we cannot reject our working hy-
pothesis, namely that U.S. commercial banks increased non-price rationing
sharply during the crisis. Furthermore, at the height of the financial tur-
moil, i.e. in the third quarter of 2008 when the failure of Lehman Brothers
shook the global financial system to its very foundations, excess demand for
credit reached its highest level in the whole sample period, totalling 19.87 bn
(constant 2005 USD) – this figure corresponds to 1.74% of total demand for
credit. In other words, the level of bank debt firms wanted to hold was 19.87
bn higher than what commercial banks were willing to offer.
However, one has to put these numbers into perspective by considering
information from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending.27 According
to survey data the total value of C&I loans issued by domestically chartered
commercial banks in the U.S. in the first full business week in November 2008,
i.e. shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, was 45 bn (constant 2005
USD). Thus, the estimated extent of excess demand for credit is negligible
small.
Together, these results suggest that although there is credit rationing in
27In the Survey of Terms of Business Lending the U.S. Federal Reserve collects infor-
mation concerning price and non-price terms of business loans made during the first full
business week of the mid-month of each quarter. The collected data also include detailed
information on individual business loans made during the survey week. Based on this infor-
mation monetary authorities estimate the terms of business lending in the whole U.S. mar-
ket for C&I loans. For more information see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/.
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the U.S. market for C&I loans and there was an increase in rationing during
the recent financial crisis, excess demand for credit does not constitute an
important phenomenon. In particular, the low degree of rationing casts into
doubt the conjecture that excess credit demand had a substantial effect on
the real sector. This conclusion is also consistent with the latest findings of
Berger & Udell (1992) presented in section 3.2.1.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we address the question whether U.S. commercial banks in-
creased non-price credit rationing sharply in the market for C&I loans during
the financial crisis that started in 2007. For this purpose we unify the disequi-
librium econometric framework with the survey approach to credit rationing.
This combined approach not only employs an excess demand indicator that
is likely to be superior to previous indicators but it also allows us to account
for many potential sources of misspecification due to the tractability of dise-
quilibrium models with sample separation information. While a preliminary
analysis shows that there was indeed a sharp increase in credit rationing dur-
ing the crisis, our estimation results suggest that credit rationing in general
is only a minor issue. In particular, our findings do not support the popular
view that non-price credit rationing acted as a major transmission channel
during the crisis. However, our analysis does not rule out the possibility
that conventional price rationing played an important role in terms of the
transmission of the crisis to the real sector. Furthermore, we do not exclude
that banks resorted to non-price credit rationing in other loan markets such
as the wholesale funds markets, in which banks lend excess funds to other
banks.
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3.5 Appendix
Consider the following (simplified) dynamic disequilibrium model:
dt = α1 + α2pt + α3xd,t + α4dt−1 + d,t (3.8)
st = β1 + β2pt + β3xs,t + β4st−1 + s,t (3.9)
qt = min(dt, st) (3.10)
dt − st = δit (3.11)
Note that for it = ∆pt and δ = 1/γ a dynamic version of model C is
obtained while for it = zt+1 sample separation information is based on the
excess demand indicator proposed by Harris (1974). From the minimum
condition (3.10) and the deterministic indicator function (3.11) one can infer
that in case of dt < st demand and supply are equal to dt = qt and st = qt−δit
respectively while if dt ≥ st demand and supply are given by dt = qt + δit
and st = qt.
In the second case, the system can be written as
qt + δit = α1 + α2pt + α3xd,t + α4dt−1 + d,t
qt = β1 + β2pt + β3xs,t + β4st−1 + s,t
while in the first it is given by
qt = α1 + α2pt + α3xd,t + α4dt−1 + d,t
qt − δit = β1 + β2pt + β3xs,t + β4st−1 + s,t
Using the two auxiliary variables
i+t =
{
it if it > 0
0 otherwise
i−t =
{
−it if it ≤ 0
0 otherwise
the two cases from above can be combined to yield
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qt + δi
+
t = α1 + α2pt + α3xd,t + α4dt−1 + d,t
qt + δi
−
t = β1 + β2pt + β3xs,t + β4st−1 + s,t
The (unobserved) lagged endogenous explanatory variables dt−1 and st−1
are replaced in a similar way, noting that equation (3.11) holds for all periods.
This finally yields the system
qt + δi
+
t = α1 + α2pt + α3xd,t + α4(qt−1 + δi
+
t−1) + d,t (3.12)
qt + δi
−
t = β1 + β2pt + β3xs,t + β4(qt−1 + δi
−
t−1) + s,t (3.13)
If the indicator variable is the change in the price, such as in model C,
then the endogenous variables of the transformed system are qt, pt, i+t and
i−t . On the other hand, if indicator z is used then the endogenous variables
are qt, i+t and i
−
t . In the latter case, pt would be exogenous as in model A.
Assuming, however, that the price adjusts to imbalances between demand
and supply, we can treat pt as implicitly endogenous in the estimation of
equations (3.12) and (3.13) as suggested by Rudebusch (1987). The major
advantage of this procedure is that it does not require an explicit specification
of the price adjustment equation.
Further note that from equation (3.11) it is apparent that an estimate for
excess demand is given by δˆit, where δˆ is an estimate for the true parameter
value. Besides, first differencing the indicator equation (3.11) yields ∆dt −
∆st = δ∆it. An estimate for the change in excess demand is then given by
δˆ∆it because ∆dt −∆st = (dt − st)− (dt−1 − st−1).
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3.5.2 Graphical Data Representation
Figure 3.5: Level Data
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Figure 3.6: Data in First Differences
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Chapter 4
Wholesale Funding and
Commercial Bank Lending –
Implications from the 2008
Liquidity Crunch
4.1 Introduction
Maturity transformation, i.e. converting short-term liabilities such as retail
deposits into long-term assets, is one of the major functions performed by
financial intermediaries. The resulting maturity mismatch, however, leaves
intermediaries like banks particularly vulnerable to runs by uninformed de-
positors.1 For this reason many economies have introduced deposit insurance
so that traditional bank runs have become an outdated phenomenon.
In the recent past, though, banks have increasingly supplemented their
deposit base with so-called wholesale funds which are often provided by arm’s
length markets. During the global financial crisis that started in 2007 these
markets essentially shut down. The sudden dry up of wholesale funding
sources combined with the increased reliance on these funds resulted in the
modern equivalent of a bank run. Unfortunately, the modern form, which
has been referred to as liquidity crunch by Brunnermeier (2009), unfolded
similar deleterious effects as its traditional counterpart. In fact, it not only
amplified the crisis – which was thought to be confined to the subprime
1More information on traditional bank runs is provided in Diamond & Dybvig (1983).
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mortgage sector – but it also helped to propagate it.
While scholars have mainly emphasised the advantages of bank whole-
sale funding, the crisis has provoked a shift towards the disadvantages. The
empirical analysis presented in this chapter follows this development. In par-
ticular, we study whether the liquidity crunch negatively affected the lending
behaviour of U.S. commercial banks that relied more heavily on wholesale
funds. Although our analysis is closely related to the study by Ivashina
& Scharfstein (2010), there are important differences. First of all, we use a
much larger dataset on individual bank level data that covers all insured U.S.
commercial banks. Besides, the dataset not only captures large syndicated
loans but various types of loans. Furthermore, we control for other factors
that may have caused a change in the supply of credit, such as equity capi-
tal holdings. Finally, and probably most important, we analyse whether the
crunch had a larger effect in terms of lending on banks with less liquid bal-
ance sheets. To our knowledge, the relation between wholesale dependence
and liquidity during a crisis has not been analysed before.
Our results are particularly interesting with regard to banking regulation.
For instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has suggested
the introduction of minimum global liquidity standards in response to the
observed run by lenders.2 The objective of these standards is twofold: first
to strengthen the resilience of banks to short-term disruptions in the access
to funding and second to provide incentives for banks to use more stable
sources of funding. Our analysis, in turn, allows us to evaluate whether the
introduction of a short-term liquidity coverage ratio is likely to mitigate the
effects of a disruption in funding access. Furthermore, if lending is found to
be strongly affected by the reliance on wholesale funds – potentially having
negative effects on the real economy – then the committee’s proposal to
curtail the use of wholesale funds and foster the use of more stable sources
of funds receives further support.
The first part of this chapter, consisting of sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3, discusses
bank wholesale funding and provides some details on the liquidity crunch and
its implications for bank lending. Section 4.3, which is the main part of this
chapter, presents our empirical analysis, i.e. the specifications we estimate,
the dataset we use and the results of our estimations. Finally, section 4.4
concludes.
2See, for instance, The Basel Committee’s response to the financial crisis: report to the
G20, published by the Bank of International Settlement in October 2010.
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4.2 Review
4.2.1 Bank Wholesale Funding
Banks cannot raise an infinite amount of funds via retail deposits. This is
because they can only access a limited pool of potential depositors.3 There-
fore banks also use funds from various other sources. These additional funds
are typically provided by professional investors, banks and other corpora-
tions which is why they are called wholesale funds, managed liabilities or
non-retail funds. Banks usually raise these funds on a short-term rollover
basis, i.e. they continuously tap the wholesale funds markets to repay ma-
turing liabilities. One reason for this is that funds borrowed long-term are
associated with higher costs. The instruments used for this type of short-
term funding include certificates of deposits or brokered deposits, repurchase
agreements, Fed funds, interbank loans and commercial paper. In contrast to
retail deposits, wholesale funds are in most instances uninsured and they are
not subject to a reserve requirement. Furthermore, they are mostly provided
by arm’s length markets implying that their availability crucially depends on
the smooth functioning of these markets.
Albeit wholesale funding is not a new phenomenon in banking, it has
attracted more and more interest in the recent past. This is mainly due
to the fact that banks increasingly use wholesale funds to supplement their
deposit base. Table 4.1 illustrates this point: while the fraction of deposits to
assets declined by more than ten percentage points in the time period from
1980 to 2010, the fraction of all other, non-retail liabilities increased.4 Thus,
Table 4.1 supports the conjecture that there has been a noticeable change in
the way how banks finance their assets. The advantages and disadvantages
respectively this change entails are the subject of a relatively young research
literature whose findings we briefly summarise below.
From a social point of view, probably the most important argument for
wholesale funding is that banks can finance socially beneficial investments
without being constrained by a local deposit base. According to Calomiris
(1999), another benefit is that wholesale financiers provide for market dis-
3Despite globalisation and the Internet revolution, retail banking can still be charac-
terised as a local business. This is probably due to high transaction costs.
4Table 4.1 is based on balance sheet data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition
and Income, the so-called Call Reports. They are collected quarterly and cover all insured
U.S. commercial banks. For more information on our dataset see section 4.3.2.
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1980q1 1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
# of Banks 14,362 14,364 12,441 10,151 8,439 7,517 6,703
% of Total Assets
Total Deposits 80.27 77.96 76.60 69.53 66.57 66.60 68.78
Federal Funds Borrowed 6.52 7.61 8.49 7.80 8.18 6.92 4.72
Subordinated Debt 0.36 0.47 0.59 1.00 1.37 1.35 1.25
Equity 5.88 6.29 6.37 7.86 8.40 10.05 10.72
Other Liabilities 6.97 7.68 7.94 13.81 15.48 15.08 14.53
Table 4.1: Liability Structure of U.S. Commercial Banks
cipline of banks by threatening to withdraw (uninsured) funds if the assets
of a bank become too risky. In a similar vein, Feldman & Schmidt (2001)
argue that prices paid by banks on uninsured wholesale deposits could help
regulators to assess the financial condition of banks. In particular, higher
market prices would send a signal of greater bank risk taking to regulators.
From the perspective of banks, on the other hand, wholesale funds represent
a relatively attractive way to expand their operations, i.e. to increase the
size of their balance sheets. Moreover, the higher leverage implies that banks
can increase their profitability measured as the return on equity (ROE), for
instance. Mishkin (2004) further notes that these funds can be used to refi-
nance unexpected retail withdrawals.
However, there is also a dark side of bank wholesale funding, as empha-
sised by Huang & Ratnovski (2011). Their paper challenges the assumption
of Calomiris (1999) that wholesale financiers have an incentive to monitor
the risk taking of individuals banks. In particular, they show that if there is
a costless but noisy public signal on the quality of a bank’s assets, financiers
have a lower incentive to monitor the bank. Under certain conditions this can
lead to a situation in which wholesale financiers withdraw their funds based
on an erroneous signal, implying that a healthy bank faces a run by lenders
– as we argue below, this is likely what happened during the recent financial
crisis. Another disadvantage of wholesale funding was identified by Kashyap
& Stein (2000) in a paper on the bank lending channel. They show that
small banks, which presumably have less access to wholesale funds markets,
react stronger to a monetary contraction in terms of lending than big banks
with better access to wholesale funds. Thus, the effectiveness of monetary
policy could be reduced by an increased use of wholesale funding.
The financial crisis that started in 2007 has revealed yet another weakness
of short-term funding via arm’s length markets. One result of the turmoil
in these markets, equatable only with a system-wide bank run, was that a
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vicious deleveraging process was set in motion which not only amplified the
crisis but also helped to propagate it. Since the events during and after this
modern equivalent of a bank run, which has been referred to as liquidity
crunch, are most important for our analysis, we discuss them in more detail
in the following section.
4.2.2 The Liquidity Crunch
The term liquidity is used in different ways. One definition that suits our pur-
poses comes from Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) who distinguish between
market liquidity and funding liquidity. While the former is characterised as
the ease with which an asset can be traded, the latter is the ease with which
investors can obtain funding. In other words, at higher funding liquidity it
is easier for investors to raise money in the market. Drehmann & Nikolaou
(2009), in turn, offer a related definition in which funding liquidity is the
ability to settle obligations immediately when they become due. Based on
this definition it is straightforward to define the concept of funding liquidity
risk as the risk that over a specific time horizon a bank will be unable to
settle its obligations immediately.5
According to Brunnermeier (2009) funding liquidity risk is made up of
three types of risk. The first is margin or haircut risk. In a repurchase
agreement, for instance, a bank sells securities and agrees to buy back these
securities at some point in the future. In such a transaction the bank usually
does not get the total value of the securities it sells and the (percentage)
difference between the value of the securities and the amount it gets is called
haircut. If the haircut increases, a bank can raise fewer funds from selling
securities temporarily. Margin risk, on the other hand, is associated with
margin lending where a bank borrows funds to acquire an asset and where
it uses the asset as collateral. Typically, banks cannot borrow the whole
amount and the difference is called margin. Since the margin is not fixed,
banks face the risk of a margin call, i.e. they may have to provide additional
funds. The second risk is rollover risk. As already outlined above, banks
continuously tap wholesale funds markets, like the commercial paper market
or the interbank market, to repay maturing liabilities, i.e. they roll over
their debt. If investors buy less commercial paper or banks are reluctant
5Notice that in the definition of Drehmann & Nikolaou (2009) funding liquidity is a
point-in-time, zero-one concept while funding liquidity risk is forward looking and depends
on a specific time horizon. Besides, the latter can take on many values.
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to make loans to other banks then rolling over debt becomes more difficult.
And finally there is the risk of withdrawal, meaning that wholesale financiers,
such as hedge funds, who provide funds via large deposits, suddenly withdraw
their funds.
During the recent financial crisis funding liquidity evaporated in wholesale
funds markets because all three risks materialised. Shin (2009), for instance,
concludes that the failure of the British savings and mortgage bank Northern
Rock can be mainly attributed to the fact that this highly leveraged bank was
not able to roll over its maturing debt in the commercial paper market. In
contrast, according to Brunnermeier (2009) an important factor in the demise
of the investment bank Bear Stearns was that in March 2008 the bank was
suddenly unable to secure funding in the repo market due to rumours about
the solvency of the bank. The situation was further aggravated because hedge
fund clients of the bank withdrew funds on a large scale.
Figure 4.1, which depicts a popular indicator for the condition of whole-
sale funds markets, provides further evidence for the dry up in wholesale
funding sources and the subsequent liquidity crunch. It shows the spread be-
tween the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (3m-Libor) for U.S.
Dollar denominated loans and the rate on three-month U.S. Treasury Bills
between 2006 and 2010. The graph indicates that the spread, also referred
to as TED spread, tends to be quite low implying that the risk of lending to
a bank instead of lending to the U.S. government is perceived to be small. In
other words, banks can obtain funds relatively cheap in the interbank market.
With the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, however, the costs of borrowing
in the interbank market rose sharply, reaching an all-time high in September
2008 when the investment bank Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.
The examples mentioned above highlight the fact that it became increas-
ingly difficult for banks to settle their obligations due by using wholesale
funds. This has led Brunnermeier (2009) to refer to the worsening liquidity
situation as liquidity crunch. The question is, how this crunch fits into the
wider context of the financial crisis. Blanchard (2008), for instance, charac-
terises its role during the recent crisis as follows.
The bursting of the bubble in the U.S. housing market in early 2007
resulted in great uncertainty about the value of a large number of assets,
including highly complex and opaque mortgage related credit derivatives,
which had been distributed around the globe as a result of securitisation.
This not only increased the uncertainty about the value of bank capital but
also the probability of insolvency of many financial institutions. Wholesale
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Figure 4.1: TED Spread
financiers, who had become more and more important, therefore wanted
to take their funds out of institutions that they perceived to be too risky.
Depositors, on the other hand, had no incentive to take out their funds since
they were mostly insured. The run by lenders was not targeted at specific
banks as in a traditional bank run but this time it was system-wide. As
a result, banks could no longer refinance themselves – or only at very high
costs – via wholesale funds markets. In addition, Ivashina & Scharfstein
(2010) note that the run by lenders was accompanied by a run of borrowers
who drew down on existing credit lines for fear of a shortage of bank credit,
thereby aggravating the funding situation of banks even further.
This liquidity crunch had the same consequences as a traditional run:
since banks could not borrow funds they had to shrink the asset side of their
balance sheets, i.e. they had to deleverage – for a detailed analysis of the
deleveraging process see section 4.2.3. Furthermore, banks had to maintain
adequate capital ratios for regulatory reasons, for instance. Since additional
equity was difficult to obtain in these market circumstances banks had to
deleverage even more. This process involved selling assets at fire-sale prices,
mainly because there were few deep pocket investors who could counter the
excess supply of assets. Therefore asset prices got even more depressed and
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the uncertainty about bank capital further increased.
This stylised description of the various stages during the crisis makes
clear that a vicious circle was set in motion in which the liquidity crunch
played a prominent role. Factors that exacerbated the process include the
high leverage of a large number of banks, the complexity of many assets
and the shift towards the originate-to-distribute business model which was
facilitated by securitisation. Brunnermeier (2009) also emphasises that it
was the interrelation between funding and market liquidity that fuelled this
vicious circle which he calls the liquidity spiral. However, we are not so much
interested in the liquidity crunch and its causes but rather in its implications,
which we deal with in the following section.
4.2.3 Wholesale Funding, Liquidity and Bank Lending
In order to analyse the implications of the liquidity crunch we start with a
typical balance sheet of a bank.6 The right side of this balance sheet shows
all bank liabilities, including equity capital, or the sources of funds. The
left side, in turn, lists all assets of a bank or the use of funds. Given this
snap-shot of the condition of a bank the question is how a liquidity crunch
affects bank (lending) behaviour.
Suppose, for instance, that the bank under consideration uses an amount
x of wholesale funds to finance a fraction of its assets. For simplicity, further
assume that these debts all mature at the same time and are short-term.
After a shock to the financial system the bank is not able to roll over the
total amount of x in wholesale funds markets but only an amount y < x.
As a result, the bank is short of funds since in order to settle its obligations
equal to x it needs an amount of (x− y) in additional funds.7
In such a strained liquidity situation, the bank basically has two options
to raise the additional funds needed. First, it could borrow from the lender of
last resort, i.e. the central bank. However, as was the case during the recent
financial crisis, banks may be reluctant to use this option because they could
get stigmatised by the market and thus would even have a harder time to
raise funds. Therefore, many banks that have a lack of funding liquidity
during a modern bank run probably revert to the second measure, namely
6See Mishkin (2004), chapter 9, for an introduction to bank balance sheets.
7Notice that the case we describe is similar to a situation in which a bank faces a
massive deposit outflow which it cannot cover with its reserves, as in a traditional bank
run.
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Figure 4.2: Growth Rate of Total Loans Outstanding
to shrink the asset side of the balance sheet to use the proceeds to settle
their obligations. This process is referred to as deleveraging and it implies
the shrinking of the bank balance sheet to pay off debt. Essentially, a bank
can deleverage by selling some of its assets, like bonds or stocks, or it can
stop lending – in reality, banks probably implement a combination of both
measures. The latter involves that the bank does not make any new loans,
it does not roll over existing debt or even calls in loans. Figure 4.2, which
is based on Call Report data, suggests that this is indeed what happened
during the recent crisis. Although the growth rate of the amount of total
loans outstanding increased during the first phase of the crisis from 2007 to
2008, which is probably due to the aforementioned run by borrowers, in the
second phase the growth rate declined sharply, implying that banks reduced
lending by a considerable amount.
Given these basic balance sheet mechanics, consider a case with two al-
most identical banks. The only difference between the two is that bank A
uses an amount xA of wholesale funds while bank B uses an amount xB < xA.
Again assume that after a financial shock in form of a liquidity crunch both
banks are only able to roll over part of their wholesale debts, i.e. an amount
y < xB < xA. Since bank A needs more additional funds than bank B to
settle its obligations, it is reasonable to assume that bank A will delever-
age more than bank B, implying that it will also lend less. Therefore our
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first hypothesis with regard to the recent financial crisis reads as follows:
U.S. commercial banks which had been more dependent on wholesale funds
decreased loan supply more than banks which had been less dependent.
The motivation for our second hypothesis is based on a different obser-
vation. Mishkin (2004), for instance, notes with regard to the deleveraging
process that the costliest way for a bank to acquire additional funds is to
reduce lending, mainly because the bank loses customers. He argues that
selling assets with a high market liquidity is associated with lower costs.8
This suggests that a bank with a very liquid balance sheet, meaning that
the market liquidity of its assets is very high, probably deleverages by sell-
ing assets instead of reducing its lending.9 Thus, our second hypothesis can
be stated in the following way: Wholesale dependent U.S. commercial banks
which had had a highly liquid balance sheet decreased loan supply less than
wholesale dependent banks with less liquid balance sheets.
The empirical evidence gathered so far suggests that we cannot reject ei-
ther hypothesis, although for hypothesis number two it is very sparse. Rad-
datz (2010), for instance, uses data for more than 600 banks in over 40
countries, excluding the U.S., to study the propagation of the financial crisis
that started in 2007 and its real consequences. With regard to the latter,
he analyses the effect of wholesale dependence on bank lending in a simple
regression framework. His results indicate that banks with a higher whole-
sale dependence reduced lending more during the crisis than banks with a
lower dependence. He also claims that this relationship is meaningful from
an economic perspective.
Another interesting analysis with regard to hypothesis number one is the
study by Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010). They too analyse the effect of the
modern form of a bank run on lending. Their findings suggest that banks
which were more vulnerable to the run, i.e. banks with a higher depen-
dence on wholesale funds and banks which potentially faced more credit line
drawdowns, did indeed reduce loan supply more than less vulnerable banks.
Unfortunately, their analysis is based on syndicated loans only, implying that
it does not cover the large fraction of small non-syndicated loans – another
shortcoming is that their analysis is based on very few observations. Besides,
8In this respect, Brunnermeier (2009) highlights the fact that a reduction in funding
liquidity and the subsequent deleveraging process is detrimental for a bank only, if it has
to sell assets at fire-sale prices, i.e. if the market liquidity of its assets is low.
9Note that the short-term liquidity coverage ratio proposed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision is aimed at this effect.
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they do not observe the amount lent by an individual bank but only the total
amount lent by the syndicate.
In terms of hypothesis number two, the study by Kashyap & Stein (2000)
is probably the only point of reference up to now. Their analysis concentrates
on the monetary-transmission mechanism and in particular on the bank lend-
ing channel. The latter predicts that a monetary contraction, which drains
reserves from the banking sector, negatively affects the lending behaviour of
banks with less liquid balance sheets – and less access to wholesale funds
markets – more than of banks with more liquid assets. The argument is
mainly based on the consideration that banks with more liquid assets can
easily cover a loss in reserves, while banks with less liquid assets cannot and
therefore they have to reduce lending. The findings of the two authors sup-
port this argument and indicate the existence of a separate bank lending
channel next to the conventional interest-rate channel. Considering hypoth-
esis number two, the question is whether this result only holds for a loss in
reserves or also for a sudden reduction in the availability of wholesale funds.
In order to answer this question and to gather further evidence regarding
the impact of wholesale dependence on bank lending during a liquidity crisis,
we test our two hypotheses empirically in the following part of this chapter.
Our analysis involves a number of refinements compared to previous studies,
including the fact that we use a large dataset that covers all insured U.S.
commercial banks. Furthermore, as we have already outlined above, our
analysis is particularly interesting from the perspective of banking regulation
since our results have implications for the adequacy of the proposed minimum
global liquidity standards.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
Testing our two hypotheses empirically requires that we analyse bank lending
behaviour at the individual bank level. In particular, we have to determine
how certain bank characteristics, such as wholesale funds dependence, influ-
enced subsequent bank lending. Thus, we use cross-sectional data for our
analysis. This micro-econometric approach also helps us to confront the
problem of disentangling loan supply from loan demand effects that arises
with aggregate loan data.
However, as noted by Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010), using individual
bank level data still does not fully eliminate this problem. For instance,
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if banks, which are more dependent on wholesale funds, also tend to lend
to firms whose loan demand decreases more during a crisis – an example
would be investment banks and loans for merger and acquisitions – then
finding a negative relation between wholesale dependence and subsequent
lending could be the result of loan demand rather than loan supply. Our
specification, in turn, which we present in the following section, mitigates
this problem by assuming that the marginal effect of wholesale dependence
on lending is a function of bank liquidity. If we find evidence that this effect
actually varies with liquidity then it is hard to argue that our results are due
to changes in loan demand.10
4.3.1 Variables and Specification
As already indicated above, for our analysis we regress the growth rate of the
amount of total loans outstanding in different time periods on a number of
indicators at certain time points. For instance, loan growth of bank i in the
period from the second quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008, which
we denote as gL,i,Crisis1, is regressed on balance sheet indicators at the end
of the second quarter of 2007. For comparative purposes we also regress the
growth rate of bank i in the period from the second quarter of 2008 to the
second quarter of 2009, denoted as gL,i,Crisis2, on balance sheet indicators at
the end of the second quarter of 2008. The main reason for choosing these
particular time periods is that the Crisis1 period contains the beginning of
the crisis and the onset of the turmoil in wholesale funding markets while the
height of the crisis, i.e. the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the peak
of the liquidity crunch fall into the Crisis2 period – see also Figure 4.1. The
equations we estimate with OLS have the following form:
gL,i,CrisisT = α + β1WDi + β2WDi ∗ L˜Qi + β3EQi (4.1)
+β4UCi + β5gL,i,CrisisT−1 + β6Si + ui
with T = {1, 2}. Note that the regression where the dependent variable is
gL,i,Crisis1 includes the explanatory variable gL,i,Crisis0 on the right hand side.
This variable is the growth rate of the amount of total loans outstanding in
10Notice that one would have to explain why the lending behaviour of banks with the
same degree of wholesale dependence, i.e. which face a similar decrease in loan demand,
differs.
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the time period from the second quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2007,
i.e. the rate of growth before the crisis. The reason for actually including
a lag of the dependent variable is to control for unobserved individual bank
characteristics. Another control is bank size S which is calculated as the
fraction of the assets of bank i to the total assets of all banks in the sample.
The amount of total loans outstanding, on which our growth rates are
based, is given by the sum of real estate loans, agricultural loans, commercial
and industrial loans as well as consumer loans – for a detailed description of
how we calculate our variables see Table 4.5 in the appendix. Notice that this
amount is a stock variable and that ideally we would use data on loan flows to
calculate the growth rates used in our regressions. However, since flow data
are not available we have to use stocks.11 The main problem with the stock
of loans outstanding is that it does not only change because of new loans
but also because of loan retirements and drawdowns on existing credit lines.
The latter is of particular concern given the evidence for a run by borrowers.
In order to control for an increase in the amount of total loans outstanding
during the crisis due to this run we include the ratio of unused commitments
to total assets, denoted by UC, in all regressions. The coefficient sign of this
variable is expected to be positive, i.e. banks with a higher amount of unused
commitments are more likely to increase subsequent lending due to a run by
borrowers.
Another control variable is EQ which is the ratio of equity capital to total
assets. The reason why we include this variable in our specification is the
following. Assume that a shock reduces both equity capital and the value
of risk weighted assets of a bank by an amount  and the bank is unable to
raise any new equity. The question in this case is by how much does the bank
have to decrease risk weighted assets in order to maintain the equity to risk
weighted asset ratio from before the shock. When equity is given by Et before
the shock and risk weighted assets are given by At then we are searching for
the value of x that fulfils the condition (Et − )/(At − − x) = Et/At. Also
note that the value of x can be interpreted as the amount the bank has to
deleverage. It is straightforward to show that x = (At − Et)/Et and that
∂x/∂Et < 0. In other words, a bank with a bigger capital buffer before the
shock will have to decrease risk weighted assets, including loans, less than
11In this respect Bernanke & Lown (1991) argue that if loan maturities are rather long
then the real value of new loans is best approximated with the nominal growth rate of
loans outstanding.
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a bank with a smaller buffer. Therefore including EQ in our regressions
controls for another channel besides the liquidity crunch that could have
affected lending during the crisis. We expect the coefficient of the equity
variable to have a positive sign.
Let us now turn to the main variables of interest, namely wholesale depen-
denceWD and liquidity LQ. Instead of using the former, many authors work
with wholesale independence which they define as the ratio of total deposits
to total assets. Unfortunately, though, this definition does not take into
account that a certain fraction of total deposits, such as brokered deposits,
are wholesale funds. In calculating an indicator for wholesale dependence
we therefore exclude deposits from domestic and foreign banks and measure
dependence as the ratio of total liabilities minus equity and adjusted deposits
to total assets. In the same way, finding an adequate indicator for the liquid-
ity of a bank’s balance sheet is not a trivial task. Kashyap & Stein (2000),
for instance, use the ratio of total security holdings to total assets. However,
this measure does not account for the fact that during the recent financial
crisis the market liquidity of many securities declined sharply, implying that
banks could sell these securities only with a huge discount. For this reason
our liquidity indicator only includes security holdings which were likely to be
highly liquid even during the crisis.12
Our second hypothesis implies that equation (4.1) should not only in-
clude wholesale dependence as explanatory variable but also an interaction
of the latter with liquidity. If we would interact WD and LQ, the marginal
effect of wholesale dependence on subsequent lending would be given by
β1 + β2LQi. The coefficient β1 would then represent the marginal effect of
wholesale dependence on lending if LQi = 0, i.e. if bank i does not hold
any liquid assets which is a rather extreme case. Therefore we reformulate
our specification in the following way. Instead of using LQi in the inter-
action term we use L˜Qi = LQi − Qz,LQ, where Qz,LQ is the z-quantile of
the LQ series – later on we limit our analysis to the three quartiles, i.e.
z = {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. Formulating our model in this way the coefficient of
WD is immediately interpretable and we also obtain standard errors for the
marginal effect of wholesale dependence at meaningful levels of LQ. Given
12With regard to liquidity, Kashyap & Stein (2000) indicate the following problem. If
a bank operates in an area that offers few good lending opportunities then the bank will
hold more liquid assets rather than making bad loans. In this case liquidity would be
an endogenous variable. However, since we analyse subsequent lending behaviour, our
explanatory variables are predetermined.
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this particular specification, our two hypotheses imply that the coefficient on
WD is negative (Hypothesis #1) while the coefficient of the interaction term
is positive, i.e. for higher levels of liquidity, the negative effect of wholesale
dependence should become smaller in absolute terms (Hypothesis #2).
4.3.2 Data
The data, on which our analysis and the results presented in the following
section are based, have been taken from the Consolidated Reports of Condi-
tion and Income, the so-called Call Reports, in which federally insured banks
in the United States disclose information from their income statement and
balance sheet on a quarterly basis.13 The data are submitted to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and they cover banks which are reg-
ulated by the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC and the Comptroller of the
Currency.
The main advantage of Call Report data is that they provide a compre-
hensive dataset that covers most of the banks operating in the United States.
The main difficulties with respect to this huge data pool are that small banks
do not report as much data as large banks and that the variables and their
measurement change over time in order to account for various developments
in the banking sector – the second point implies that it can be difficult to
form consistent time series. Notice, however, that neither of these two issues
affects our analysis. Furthermore, as we have already pointed out above, the
balance sheet data obtained from the Call Reports are stock variables.
Another issue that deserves closer attention is the distinction between
consolidated and domestic data series. The former, identified with the code
RCFD, not only include domestic but also foreign branches of a bank while
the latter, with the identifier RCON, only include domestic branches. The
choice which series a researcher should use depends on the type of analysis.
Kashyap & Stein (2000), for instance, analyse changes in bank lending be-
haviour due to monetary policy. Therefore they should use domestic data
only because the lending decisions of foreign branches are probably less de-
pendent on changes in U.S. monetary policy. In our case, in turn, we are
13The data we use can be downloaded from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago (http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/index.cfm). A good intro-
duction to Call Report bank data by den Haan et. al. can be downloaded from
http://www.csulb.edu/~gyamashi/manual.pdf.
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interested in changes of bank lending behaviour due to individual bank char-
acteristics. Thus, we opt for using consolidated data.14
Nevertheless, we restrict our sample of banks in order to ensure a certain
degree of homogeneity such that the influence of unobserved individual bank
characteristics is reduced. The restrictions to which we subject our dataset
are given in Table 4.4 in the appendix. As one can see from this table, we
concentrate on commercial banks – e.g. we exclude savings banks or credit
unions – which are insured by the FDIC and which operate within the fifty
states of the U.S. plus the District of Columbia. The reason, why we exclude
banks operating in exotic places such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, for instance,
is that these are different business environments.
In terms of outliers, our criterion of exclusion is based on the distance of
a particular observation from the 0.25- and the 0.75-quartile of the sample
respectively. For instance, an observation with an equity to asset ratio of
90% constitutes a very unusual observation that is far beyond the threshold
of the 0.75-quartile plus three times the interquartile range, wherefore we
exclude such an observation.
Finally, we restrict our sample to banks with a total loan to asset ratio of
at least 45%. On the one hand, this step is likely to reduce the heterogeneity
among the banks we analyse even further. On the other hand, since we are
interested in changes of bank lending behaviour, this restriction guarantees
that our sample only includes banks with a sizeable lending business. All
in all, the banks in our two samples – one for the Crisis1 and another for
the Crisis2 period – account for approximately three quarters of the sum of
total loans outstanding before the implementation of this restriction.
4.3.3 Estimation Results
The main results of our analysis are summarised in Table 4.2.15 Looking at
column number one, where the dependent variable is gL,i,Crisis1, we see that
the coefficients of wholesale dependence, given that LQ = Q.25,LQ, and of the
14However, in case that RCFD data are not available for a particular series we have to
use RCON data. See also Table 4.5.
15The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. The stars indicate the level of significance,
i.e. ∗∗∗ stand for the 1%-level of significance, ∗∗ for the 5%-level of significance and ∗
denotes the 10%-level of significance. Also note that in our initial regressions we found ev-
idence of heteroskedastic residuals. For this reason we estimated White Heteroskedasticity-
Consistent standard errors.
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interaction with liquidity are both significantly different from zero. Thus,
the marginal effect of wholesale dependence is actually related to liquidity
and, more importantly, a higher wholesale dependence decreases subsequent
lending growth. For higher values of liquidity, however, the effect is not
significantly different from zero.
With regard to the other explanatory variables we observe that except for
equity all variables have a statistically significant coefficient. Ceteris paribus,
these results indicate that banks with more unused commitments before the
crisis had a higher subsequent growth rate of lending, which we interpret as
evidence for the run of borrowers. Furthermore, banks with a higher growth
rate of lending in the pre-crisis period also had a higher growth rate in the
first phase of the crisis. And finally, larger banks witnessed a smaller growth
rate during the crisis. Also notice that our goodness-of-fit is not too bad
given that we work with cross-sectional data.
For the Crisis2 period, in turn, we basically get the same results – see
column two in Table 4.2. The main difference is that now the negative effect
of wholesale dependence is stronger and significant both at LQ = Q.25,LQ and
LQ = Q.5,LQ. Besides, the coefficient of equity is now significantly different
from zero and it has the expected positive sign. Unused commitments and
size, though, are less significant and the goodness-of-fit decreases slightly.16
These results support our first hypothesis, namely that more wholesale
dependent banks decreased loan supply more than less dependent banks.
With regard to our second hypothesis, we observe that in both periods the
coefficient of the interaction between wholesale dependence and liquidity is
statistically significant and positive. In other words, for higher levels of
liquidity the negative effect of wholesale dependence on subsequent lending
growth becomes smaller in absolute terms. Thus, our results also favour
our second hypothesis that wholesale dependent banks with a more liquid
balance sheet decreased loan supply less than banks with less liquid balance
sheets.
Moreover, our results are not sensitive to the indicator used for wholesale
dependence and liquidity respectively.17 Even if we run our regressions with
16Although the distributions of our residuals are not exactly normal but leptokurtic,
they have zero mean and due to the large number of observations our statistical tests still
seem to be valid.
17The alternative indicators we have used for our sensitivity analysis include the whole-
sale dependence indicator that does not account for bank deposits and the liquidity mea-
sure proposed by Kashyap & Stein (2000). See also section 4.3.1 for more information.
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(1) (2)
Dependent Variable gL,Crisis1 gL,Crisis2
const.
0.0211 0.0037
(2.7744)∗∗∗ (0.5002)
WD (if LQ = Q.25,LQ)
-0.0932 -0.1536
(-3.8786)∗∗∗ (-7.3623)∗∗∗
WD (if LQ = Q.5,LQ)
-0.0374 -0.1014
(-1.5773) (-4.8584)∗∗∗
WD (if LQ = Q.75,LQ)
0.0319 -0.0322
(1.0767) (-1.1439)
WD ∗ L˜Q 1.4294 1.2786(5.0837)∗∗∗ (4.8830)∗∗∗
EQ
-0.0372 0.1447
(-0.6092) (2.3876)∗∗
UC
0.2732 0.0472
(11.8276)∗∗∗ (1.9897)∗∗
gL,CrisisT−1
0.3363 0.2702
(21.3672)∗∗∗ (18.3567)∗∗∗
S
-1.2875 -2.6420
(-3.7025)∗∗∗ (-1.8503)∗
Obs. 5,489 5,389
adj. R2 0.17 0.11
Table 4.2: Estimation Results
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95% Confidence Interval
Crisis1 Crisis2
if LQ = Q.25,LQ [−0.14,−0.05] [−0.19,−0.11]
if LQ = Q.5,LQ [−0.08, 0.01] [−0.14,−0.06]
if LQ = Q.75,LQ [−0.02, 0.09] [−0.09, 0.02]
Table 4.3: Confidence Intervals of WD Coefficient
samples including banks with a total loans to asset ratio of below 45% the
results do not change dramatically and essentially stay the same.
The main question that arises from these results is whether they are
are also meaningful from an economic perspective. In order to answer this
question, consider a bank whose balance sheet was rather illiquid at the end of
the second quarter of 2007, i.e. liquidity was equal to the 0.25-quartile of the
LQ series. A marginal increase in wholesale funds dependence then implied
that the growth rate of the amount of total loans outstanding in the Crisis1
period decreased by five to fourteen percentage points – in the Crisis2 period
the estimated reduction would have been even larger.18 On the other hand,
a bank with a very liquid balance sheet, i.e. with liquidity equal to the 0.75-
quartile of the LQ series, would have witnessed a change in the growth of
the amount of loans outstanding of minus two to plus nine percentage points
due to a marginal increase in wholesale dependence. This suggests that a
combination of wholesale dependence and illiquid asset holdings can in fact
have a detrimental effect on the lending behaviour of individual banks during
a liquidity crunch.
Finally, with regard to banking regulation, the empirical evidence gath-
ered from our analysis supports the introduction of global minimum liquidity
standards. In particular, our results concerning the relation between whole-
sale dependence and liquidity indicate that a short-term liquidity coverage
ratio that forces banks to hold more liquid assets is likely to mitigate the ef-
fect of a disruption in wholesale funding access, at least in terms of lending.
The significant negative effect of wholesale dependence on subsequent lending
further suggests that curtailing the use of this type of funds and fostering
the use of more stable sources of funds could be warranted, although we
have to emphasise that this result is related to the lending behaviour during
18See Table 4.3 which contains the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient of whole-
sale dependence for each quartile of LQ and for each sample period.
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a liquidity crisis and not lending in general. Besides, our findings in terms
of equity capital holdings reinforce the view that banks should hold enough
(high-quality) capital. In other words, banks should have an incentive to
operate with a reasonable leverage only.
4.4 Conclusion
During the financial crisis that started in 2007 banks dependent on wholesale
funds had increasing difficulties to roll over their short-term debts because
wholesale financiers withdrew their funds. There is widespread agreement
that this liquidity crunch resulted in a vicious deleveraging cycle that ampli-
fied the crisis and helped to propagate it. In the course of this cycle banks
had to shrink the asset side of their balance sheets in order to meet obli-
gations due, implying that they had to sell securities and/or stop lending.
Against this background, this paper tests the hypothesis that more whole-
sale dependent banks reduced subsequent lending more than less dependent
banks. In addition, we analyse whether wholesale dependent banks with a
more liquid balance sheet decreased lending less than banks with less liquid
assets. The results of our empirical analysis, which covers the time period
from the second quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2008 and the period
from the second quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009, indicate that
neither of these two hypotheses can be rejected. Furthermore, our results are
not only insensitive to changes in the measurement of wholesale dependence
and liquidity respectively but they are also significant from an economic
perspective. The empirical evidence therefore supports the introduction of
global minimum liquidity standards as proposed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision and reinforces the proposal to increase the quantity
(and quality) of bank equity capital.
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Abstract
This thesis deals with the estimation of disequilibrium econometric models
as well as the implications of the financial crisis that started in 2007 on
bank lending. While the first article is solely concerned with disequilibrium
models, the third article mainly focuses on the implications of the financial
crisis on bank lending behaviour. The second article, in contrast, brings these
two research topics together.
Many markets, like the labour or the credit market, differ in some im-
portant respects from the standard market framework in economics. Dise-
quilibrium models account for this peculiarity in the sense that they do not
assume that markets necessarily clear. Two major issues in the estimation
of these models are the identification of the most appropriate model spec-
ification and the provision for dynamic model features. In the first article
we show by means of Monte Carlo sampling experiments that although the
degree of misspecification of the canonical disequilibrium models depends
on the size of a particular model parameter, researchers should pay careful
attention to the issue of specification. Our results further suggest that the
estimators of the static canonical models, though they are consistent under
certain conditions, are not reliable in dynamic settings which calls for the
use of tractable dynamic models.
In the second article we apply the disequilibrium framework to U.S. loan
market data. According to conventional wisdom the recent financial crisis
entailed a so-called credit crunch, i.e. banks cut back on lending sharply es-
sentially rationing the amount of credit. However, empirical evidence regard-
ing credit rationing in general and the credit crunch hypothesis in particular
is ambiguous. Using an alternative excess credit demand indicator – which
seems to be superior to previous indicators used – within the disequilibrium
framework, we analyse whether U.S. commercial banks have increased non-
price credit rationing sharply in the market for commercial and industrial
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loans during the crisis. Our findings suggest that although excess demand
for credit indeed increased, the extent of rationing is negligible, implying that
its real effects are moderate at most.
Finally, the financial crisis witnessed the emergence of a new form of
bank run. In this modern form, also referred to as liquidity crunch, it is not
depositors that run but wholesale financiers. The consequences, however,
are similar to a traditional run, that is banks have to shrink their balance
sheets. In the third article we show that banks more vulnerable to the run,
i.e. more wholesale dependent banks, decreased loan supply more than less
vulnerable banks and that the amount of liquid asset holdings affects lending
behaviour positively during a liquidity crunch. Thus, our results support the
introduction of liquidity standards as proposed by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision.
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Schätzung von sogenan-
nten Disequilibrium Modellen sowie mit den Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise
von 2007 auf die Vergabe von Bankkrediten. Während sich der erste Ar-
tikel ausschließlich mit Disequilibrium Modellen befasst, konzentriert sich der
dritte Artikel hauptsächlich auf die oben genannten Auswirkungen der Fi-
nanzkrise. Im Gegensatz dazu werden diese beiden Forschungsschwerpunkte
im zweiten Artikel zusammengeführt.
Viele real existierende Märkte, wie etwa der Arbeits- oder der Kredit-
markt, unterscheiden sich grundlegend von der in der ökonomischen Theorie
vorherrschenden Modellvorstellung eines Marktes. Disequilibrium Modelle
tragen dieser Diskrepanz unter anderem dadurch Rechnung indem ihnen die
Annahme zugrunde liegt, dass Märkte nicht notwendigerweise geräumt wer-
den. Zwei wesentliche Punkte bei der Schätzung von derartigen Modellen
sind das Finden der geeignetsten Modellspezifikation sowie die Berücksich-
tigung von dynamischen Modellkomponenten. Im ersten Artikel dieser Dis-
sertation zeigen wir anhand von Monte Carlo Experimenten, dass obwohl
der Grad der Misspezifikation der kanonischen Disequilibrium Modelle von
einem Modell-Parameter abhängt, Forscher sehr vorsichtig bei der Auswahl
der Modellspezifikation agieren sollten. Zudem legen unsere Resultate nahe,
dass die Verwendung von Schätzern, die auf den kanonischen, d.h. statis-
chen, Disequilibrium Modellen basieren, keine zuverlässigen Resultate liefert
wenn der zugrundeliegende datengenerierende Prozess dynamisch ist. Dieser
Umstand impliziert, dass in der Praxis auf Schätzer zurückgegriffen werden
sollte, die von dynamischen Modellen abgeleitet wurden.
Im zweiten Artikel wenden wir schließlich Disequilibrium Modelle auf
Daten des U.S. Kreditmarktes an. Laut gängiger Meinung hatte die Fi-
nanzkrise von 2007 einen sogenannten Credit Crunch zur Folge, d.h. Banken
reduzierten ihr Kreditangebot drastisch was einer Rationierung der Kredit-
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menge gleichkam. Was jedoch die empirische Beweislage mit Hinblick auf
Kreditrationierung im Allgemeinen und die Credit Crunch Hypothese im
Speziellen betrifft, so kann man von keiner eindeutigen Richtung sprechen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund analysieren wir ob Geschäftsbanken in den Vere-
inigten Staaten während der Krise tatsächlich das Angebot für Industriekred-
ite drastisch rationierten. Dabei wenden wir im Rahmen eines Disequilib-
rium Modells einen alternativen Indikator für den Nachfrageüberschuss bei
Industriekrediten an, der besser geeignet zu sein scheint als bisherige In-
dikatoren. Unsere Resultate zeigen, dass obwohl es einen Anstieg bei der
Rationierung von Kredit gegeben haben dürfte, dieser vernachlässigbar klein
war, was wiederum impliziert, dass die realen Auswirkungen dieses Anstiegs
bestenfalls moderat waren.
Schließlich beschäftigt sich der dritte Artikel mit einer neuen Form des
Bank Runs. Bei dieser neuen Form, die auch Liquidity Crunch genannt
wird, sind es nicht Privat- bzw. Kleinkunden die ihre Einlagen in großer
Zahl zurückfordern sondern Großinvestoren, wie etwa andere Banken oder
Fonds, die einer Bank Finanzmittel entziehen. Die Auswirkungen sind ähn-
lich wie bei einem herkömmlichen Bank Run, nämlich dass die betroffene
Bank ihre Bilanz schrumpfen muss. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt unsere
Untersuchung, dass Banken, die anfälliger für diese neue Form des Bank
Run waren, d.h. Banken die mehr auf Großinvestoren angewiesen waren,
ihr Kreditangebot stärker reduzierten als weniger anfällige Banken. Zudem
weisen unsere Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass dieser negative Effekt für Banken,
die über ein größeres Polster aus liquiden Mitteln verfügten, schwächer war.
Somit stützen unsere Resultate die Einführung von Liquiditätsstandards wie
sie etwa vom Baseler Komitee für Bankenaufsicht vorgeschlagen wurden.
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